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... In Our Stars: The Failure Of
American Trade Policy
"The fault dear Brutus, lies not in our stars, but in ourselves ...
Shakespeare, "Julius Caesar"-Act 1, scene II.
By William H. Lash, III t
I. Introduction
Free trade, fair trade, and protectionism: each of these terms
has been heralded as the proper trade policy of the United States.
The free traders, the intellectual heirs of Adam Smith' and David
Ricardo, 2 claim that economic efficiency is maximized in a world free
of trade barriers, where goods and services can flow freely in a
borderless world. The fair traders espouse a trade policy of recipro-
cal trade benefits. 3 Under this model, the real exchange is an ex-
change of trade privileges and market access. Finally, the
protectionists support an "America First" theory of trade. Tariffs,
quotas and other trade barriers would be used to keep foreign goods
from entering our shores. 4 The protectionists believe that U.S. in-
dustry benefits by being protected from foreign imports and
competition.
Current U.S. trade policy may not be conveniently described by
any of the aforementioned labels. Congress and the Administration
lower trade barriers in one sector, negotiate multilateral and bilat-
eral trade agreements for privileged trading partners, take unilateral
trade sanctions against allies and erect barriers to trade all in the
t Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Former Counsel to the
Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission. The author wishes to thank Chris-
topher Frost, Robert Parker, and Sharon Zackula for their useful comments and to ac-
knowledge the research assistance of Elizabeth Hoover and Roger Keller. This research
was supported by the Faculty Development Fund of Saint Louis University School of Law.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS (Random House 1985).
2 DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Dutton 1965).
See generally ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS (6th ed., Simon &
Schuster 1986).
3 See, e.g., Congressional Leaders are Looking at Possible Bill Merging Several Measures, 9
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 627 (1992).
4 See Election-year Politics in U.S. Likely to Complicate Trade Issues This Year, 9 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 77 (1992); Charles D. Gray & John F. Nash, Jr., U.S.-Bangladesh Towel Trade.
Who's Unfair?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 14, 1991, at 20.
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same breath. This inherent conflict stems from the failure of U.S.
policy makers to first determine what our international trade goals
should be.
Only after establishing a trade agenda, can we hope to develop a
plausible trade policy. I would like to propose the following goals of
a functional trade policy: First, the trade policy must be consistent
with the foreign policy of the state. Second, the policy must promote
economic efficiency, stimulate the economy and promote consumer
welfare. A trade policy should seek to create employment opportu-
nities and promote market efficiencies. Third, the policy must be
transparent and consistent so as not to mislead trading partners.
Fourth, the policy must be flexible and permit the adoption of new
tactics and techniques to promote trade and international political
agendas. Trade policy should be result oriented and not be bound
by ideological labels.
Our current trade policy suffers on all fronts. U.S. foreign pol-
icy is regularly jeopardized by application of the trade laws. Our
stated commitment to human rights is questioned by discriminatory
awards of trade privileges. Similarly, calls for open markets and sup-
port of the multilateral trading system are mocked by the actions of
Congress and the White House.
Furthermore, the trade policies of the U.S. should not interfere
with the country's stated foreign policy objectives. States that are
strong trading partners of the U.S. also tend to be American political
or military allies. Developing countries that are the beneficiaries of
U.S. foreign aid programs for political or humanitarian reasons
should also expect that American trade policies are consistent with
aid packages. To escape from a system of perennial debtor or wel-
fare states, U.S. trade programs must promote development in these
states and not hinder their attempts to progress. By blinding our-
selves to political and economic realities with a series of ideological
masks, the U.S. is often a rudderless ship in the seas of international
trade.
Our trading partners complain annually about the lack of trans-
parency in U.S. trade law and its application. Similarly, American
companies complain about a lack of flexibility in international trade
which deprives them of much needed assistance to enter foreign
markets. Finally, current U.S. trade-law stifles and thwarts both do-
mestic and foreign investment in many cases, leading to a loss of
employment and technological opportunities.
This article will analyze some of the major flaws in U.S. trade
policy. Particular attention will be paid to the U.S. laws and policies
concerning foreign direct investment, unilateral retaliatory actions,
antidumping, and the U.S. attitude toward the multilateral trading
system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
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Economic, legal and political suggestions for improvement of our
current situation will be presented.
II. The Iron Curtain in U.S. Markets
A. Chilling Foreign Investment: Exon-Florio
"The U.S. is not only the largest but the most open market in
the world." 5 This conclusory observation by then U.S. Secretary of
Commerce Robert Mosbacher is dazzlingly inaccurate. Although the
U.S. pushes for increased, openness in foreign markets, these re-
quests are from a house of glass. Despite the claims of the former
Secretary, the U.S. is guilty of unfair trade practices on a colossal
scale. This section will address restrictions of access to U.S. markets.
Since the days of Alexander Hamilton, the U.S. has historically
welcomed foreign direct investment. 6 Foreign capital has produced
employment 7 and tax revenues and has led to technology transfers.8
Despite the history and benefits of a liberal foreign investment pol-
icy, current federal laws and regulations restrict foreign investment
in the broadcasting, 9 domestic airline,' 0 maritime shippingII and nu-
clear energy industries.' 2 Recent attempts to extend the assault on
foreign investment would bar foreign ownership of cable TV sta-
tions"3 and concessions in the national park system as well. 14
5 U.S. Commerce Secretary Urges Japan to Remove Barriers, REUTER Bus. REP., Sept. 13,
1989 (quoting U.S. Secretary of Commerce Robert Masbacher), available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, Wires file.
6 See Japanese Investors are Valuable Helpers, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Oct. 26, 1991. "Rather
than treating the foreign investor as an adversary, we should consider him a valuable
helper for he increases our production and the efficiency of our business." Id. See generally
Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and the United States International Investment Obligations in
Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989); William Lash, 1II, The Buck
Stops Here: The Assault on Foreign Investment in the U.S., 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (1992).
7 See William H. Lash, III, Who's American? Who Knows?, J. OF CoM.,Jun. 20, 1991, at
4A. See also Alan S. Blinder, Why a War Mentality AboutJapan is Self-Defeating, Bus. WK., Jul.
16, 1990, at 18; John Hoerr, A Japanese Import That's Not Selling, Bus. WK., Feb. 26, 1990, at
86; Susan W. Liebeler, Fallacies of Discouraging Foreign Investment in the U.S., CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 5, 1990, at 19. See generally NORMAN J. GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS P. WOOD-
WARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS: HOW FOREIGN INVESTORS ARE CHANGING THE U.S. ECONOMY
(1989), at 312-16.
8 See, e.g., Nippon Sanso Acquires Texas-Based Industrial Gas Operator Semi Gas, COMLINE
DAILY NEWS TOKYoFINANCIAL WIRE, Jan. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires
file.
9 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-310 (1988).
10 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1988).
I See, e.g., Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-889 (1989); Shipping Act
of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1988).
12 See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1988).
IS See, e.g., The Foreign Ownership of Cable Television Act of 1989, H.R. 2643, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
14 See, e.g., H.R. 542, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 3726, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Resolution Regarding Awarding Con-
tracts in National Park System, H.R. Con. Res. 14, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Sense of
Congress Regarding Concession Units in National Parks, H.R. Con. Res. 20, 102d Cong.,
1992]
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The primary vehicle for chilling foreign investment in the U.S. is
the Exon-Florio Act.' 5 In 1988, Congress, believing foreign invest-
ment in certain critical industries could adversely affect national se-
curity, enacted the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense
Production Act. This provision gives the President the authority,
without judicial review, to block mergers, acquisitions or takeovers of
U.S. businesses by foreign entities if such business dealings threaten
to impair U.S. national security.' 6 Exon-Florio is administered by
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),
an interagency group composed of the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General,
the U.S. Trade Representative, the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advis-
ers and the Secretary of the Treasury, who serves as chairman. 17
Pursuant to Exon-Florio foreign acquirers of U.S. firms may file
a "voluntary" report with CFIUS. The review period of the CFIUS
submission may take up to ninety days. Within thirty days of receipt
of written notice of a transaction, the committee decides whether to
investigate the transaction. A full investigation takes forty-five more
days, and the President can take an additional fifteen days to decide
whether to block the acquisition.' 8
Although the committee has received nearly 700 notifications of
foreign acquisitions under Exon-Florio, it has opened only 12 full
investigations.' 9 The only time Exon-Florio has been used to block a
transaction was in 1990, when the President ordered the import-ex-
port arm of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of the People's Re-
public of China to divest its interest in MAMCO, a Seattle-based firm
that manufactures metal parts for civilian aircraft, primarily for
Boeing.20
Congress has been unimpressed with its watchdog. Critics claim
the committee fails to investigate enough transactions and blocks
even fewer deals. To vent this displeasure, Congress seems deter-
1st Sess. (1991); Lujan Defends Agreement to Sell Matsushita Yosemite Park Concession to Park
Foundation, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 90 (1991).
15 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021,
102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (amending the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App.
2061, et seq.).
16 Id
17 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(note) (1988); Exec. Order No.
11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975).
18 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(note) (1988); Exec. Order No.
11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975).
19 See generally Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles Exon-Florio Reviews, Lawyers Told, 9
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 325 (1992); Andrew Rosenthal, Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale
of Aviation Concern to China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at 1.
20 MAMCO received an extension of time to complete this divestiture. Lionel Barber
& Nancy Dunne, Washington Expected to Let Peking Delay Divestment, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 1990,
at 8.
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mined to place more impediments on foreign investors and to
amend Exon-Florio.
The leading expression of Congressional dissatisfaction with the
administration of Exon-Florio is the proposed Technology Preserva-
tion Act of 1991,21 introduced by Rep. Cardiss Collins (D-Ill), and
co-sponsored by Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-Mo). The bill would re-
quire the committee to investigate any acquisition of a U.S. company
involving "critical technology." 22 Other proposed changes to Exon-
Florio would transfer chairmanship of the committee to the Secre-
tary of Commerce and replace the Chairman of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers and the Director of OMB with the Secretary of
Energy, the National Security Adviser and the Presidential Adviser
for Science and Technology. The bill would also allow the President
to nullify transactions that impair national security and to "restore
such parties to the positions they held before.''23
The bill was modified on October 23, 1991 by the Commerce,
Consumer Protection and Competitiveness Subcommittee of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee. The new version of the
Act gives the President total discretion to obtain any required assur-
ances from foreign buyers to safeguard national security.24
Although the annual review by CFIUS of foreign compliance with
assurances was dropped, the new version adds CFIUS notification
for industries engaged in activities covered by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.25 Under the proposed legislation, the President's Science
Adviser would review transactions to determine whether a critical
technology is involved. 26 Although there are indications that Presi-
dent Bush will veto this legislation,2 7 nearly a dozen other bills
designed to inhibit foreign investment are winding their way through
Congress.28
21 Technology Preservation Act of 1991, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 House Panel Approves Exon-Florio Bill, 56 FED. CoNT. REP. (BNA) 14, 17 (1991).
25 Id.
26 House Subcommittee Approves Modified Version of Exon-Florio Legislation, INT'L Bus. DAILY
(BNA), Oct. 24, 1991.
27 DPA Legislation to Extend Exon-Florio Clears Senate, House Panel Approves Separate Bill, 8
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 321 (1991).
28 For example, The Foreign Investment and Economic Security Act of 1991, H.R.
2386, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), would give the president power to block acquisitions
that threaten "national and economic security." Another bill that would amend Exon-
Florio is S. 2519, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). This proposed legislation would create a
new government agency, the Office of Strategic Trade and Technology, designed to
streamline U.S. export control procedures. CFIUS would then become an office of this
new agency. Additionally, The Critical Technologies Act of 1991, H.R. 2445, 102d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1991), would "amend chapter 15 of the National Security Act of 1947 to
define critical technologies important to our national security." Under this legislation,
"critical technology" is "the act of a domestic industry in producing a product without
which machine tools necessary to support the national defense could not be produced."
The bill also would establish a "Critical Technologies Commission" and address "national
19921
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The debate on foreign investment is laced with confusion, as
states actively compete for foreign dollars and the federal govern-
ment erects new barriers.2 9 It is equally ironic to note that congres-
sional leaders such as Representative Gephardt, who vigorously
support additional restrictions on foreign investment in the United
States, are also leading the charge to threaten foreign governments
to open their markets to U.S. investors.30
B. The Results of Exon-Florio
This lack of consistency confuses our trading partners and un-
dermines U.S. efforts to open international markets through negotia-
tion.3' It also jeopardizes many struggling American manufacturers.
Recently, McDonnell Douglas proposed to sell a forty percent stake
in its flagging commercial aircraft division to Taiwan Aerospace
Corp. The struggling aircraft manufacturer would receive a much-
needed $2 billion capital infusion from its Taiwanese partners. This
added capital would greatly assist McDonnell Douglas in building
the new MD- 12 jumbo jet and in competing with the heavily subsi-
dized European Airbus consortium.3 2 The strategic alliance also
promises to promote sales in the expanding markets of the Pacific
Rim. This transaction has all the indicators of success: a motivated
seller, an eager buyer, access to new markets and the preservation of
thousands ofjobs in a shrinking market. Unfortunately, the national-
ity of the buyer may prove to be a substantial obstacle to this friendly
transaction. Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) is asking the federal gov-
ernment to review the deal in the name of national security. Thirty
Democratic senators signed a letter asking President Bush to block
McDonnell Douglas' proposed sale of forty percent of its commercial
aircraft division to Taiwan Aerospace Corporation under the Exon-
Florio Act. 33
This would not be the first time that Exon-Florio has been used
to stop or chill a transaction. For example, in February, 1991, Fanuc
Ltd., a Japanese manufacturer of machine tools and industrial ro-
bots, withdrew a $10 million offer to buy forty percent of Moore Spe-
security impairment cases." Unlike other restrictive efforts, the Critical Technologies Act
defines national security. Pursuant to the bill, " 'national security interest' means the in-
terest of the United States government to preserve those basic conditions necessary for a
domestic producer, using a critical technology, that are adequate to permit capital invest-
ment for needed improvements in technology that will enable the overall domestic indus-
try to remain competitive." Id.
29 States currently spend anywhere from tens to hundreds of millions of dollars to
attract foreign investment. See GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 226-44.
30 Schumer to Introduce Tougher Bill on Fair Trade in Financial Services, 8 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1149 (1991).
31 William H. Lash, III, Why Not Let McDonnell Douglas Deal Fly?, ST. Louis POST Dis-
PATCH, Dec. 1, 1991, at 3C.
32 William H. Lash, III, Crossed Signals on Investment, J. OF COM., Dec. 3, 1991, at 10A.
33 Id.
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ciahy Tool Co. of Bridgeport, Connecticut (Moore). Moore is a
subcontractor to Department of Energy contractors that produce nu-
clear weapons. The dim view that CFIUS initially took of the deal
probably contributed to Fanuc's retreat.
3 4
A similar fate befell a proposed acquisition of a Perkin-Elmer
high technology business by the Japanese Corporation Nikon.
Perkin-Elmer is one of the last remaining American makers of equip-
ment that etches circuits on semiconductor chips. "The proposed
sale was called off in the face of mounting political opposition in the
United States."'3 5 Not content with Nikon's retreat from the deal,
Sen. Exon and Rep. Florio sought to turn the foreign company's de-
feat into a rout. They asked the Administration to block the saleof
Perkin-Elmer's semiconductor unit on the basis that such a sale
would threaten national security. They wrote to President Bush that
"[i]f Perkin-Elmer reaches an agreement with a foreign purchaser to
sell its division, we think there could be no more clear-cut case for
use of your full authority under the Exon-Florio amendment."
36
Investigation by CFIUS is not the only deterrent offered by
Exon-Florio. Noticeably absent from the statute is any definition of
"national security." This is not merely Congressional oversight.
Congress purposefully failed to define national security in order to
give CFIUS added flexibility. 3 7 However, this flexibility adds to the
uncertainty and confusion of foreign bidders. National security is
potentially boundless and has, on varying occasions, been applied to
the footwear, pencils, paper, pottery and peanut industries.3 8 Be-
cause national security is not defined and the notification of CFIUS is
reputedly voluntary, foreign bidders spend countless dollars and
hours in preparing needless CFIUS submissions. This lack of trans-
parency has often been a source of U.S. complaints concerning in-
vestment regulations in other states.3 9
34 Fanuc Seen Needing to Review Strategy, JAPAN EcON. J., Mar. 2, 1991, at 18.
35 Lash, supra note 32.
36 Perkin-Elmer Sale Fought, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1989, at 35.
37 Conference Report for Pub. L. 100-418 (H.Rep 100-576), 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988), at 926. The predecessor House bill was broader yet. Instead of "national secur-
ity" this legislation safeguarded "national security and essential commerce." H.R. 3,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 905, 133 CONG. REC. 2642, 2739 (1987).
38 Susan W. Liebeler, Restrictions on Foreign Investment and their Effect on Pacific Rim
Trade, Speech at the Century City Chamber of Commerce, Presidents' Forum, Los Ange-
les, California (Sept. 19, 1989). Another unlikely claimant of national security was the
wooden clothespins industry. Id. See generally Richard B. Dagen & Michael S. Knoll, Duties
to Offset Comparative Advantages, 10 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 273 (1986).
39 With national security undefined by the act, the corporate community has no gui-
dance in evaluating the Exon-Florio implications of their transactions. One critic com-
mented that "[elveryone thinks he has to file, even if he's only a cookie manufacturer."
Martin Tolchin, Agency on Foreign Takeovers Wielding Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1989, at D6.
See also Seminar Speakers Warn About Risks of U.S.-Japan Investment Disparity, DAILY REP. FOR
ExEct-rxVws (BNA), Mar. 6, 1990, at A- 1l. One of the speakers at a seminar on interna-
tional investment on March 1-2, 1990 addressed the problem of "voluntary" notification
19921
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Exon-Florio is a law ripe for abuse. Domestic corporations that
are the targets of foreign bidders in hostile takeovers may seek ref-
uge under the large and safe umbrella of national security. On
March 26, 1990, BTR plc initiated a hostile takeover of Norton Com-
pany, a Massachusetts based manufacturer of abrasives and ceramics
used in missiles. Norton successfully enlisted the assistance of the
Massachusetts Congressional delegation and claimed that the trans-
action raised questions of national security and violated Exon-Florio.
On April 19, 1990, over one hundred members of Congress joined
in the chorus of national security and sought CFIUS review of the
transaction.40 The joint Congressional authors argued, "frankly, we
do not believe that any takeover of Norton would be in our economic
security or national security interests." 4 1 The Exon-Florio national
security concerns evaporated eight days later, however, when Saint-
Gobain of France made a "white knight" bid for Norton, some
$15.00 higher than the BTR plc hostile bid.4 2
Exon-Florio also undermines the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement 43 and a host of bilateral investment treaties. Under the
FTA, restrictions on bilateral investment between the two states
were liberalized. The Canadians objected strongly in a diplomatic
note to the "poison pill" nature of Exon-Florio. Canadian trade offi-
cials attacked the uncertainty created by the act and urged the U.S. to
define national security as in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment. 44 Similarly, The U.S. successfully negotiated a series of bilat-
eral investment treaties. 45 These treaties could be jeopardized by
application of Exon-Florio. American investors might find that our
trading partners have decided to follow our example and erect in-
vestment barriers as well.
III. U.S. Unilateral Trade Actions
A. Ignoring the GA TT Processes
The U.S. has engaged in a number of practices that are contrary
under Exon-Florio. Davis Robinson commented that "[t]he fact of life is that so long as
there is a disinclination to set parameters for national security or for the risk of divestment
in the absence of notification, it is doubtful that many potential foreign acquirers will risk
not filing with CFIUS." Id.
40 Letter from House of Representatives to President George Bush (Apr. 19, 1990)
(on file with author).
41 Id.
42 Susan W. Liebeler, Norton and the Pentagon Ploy, J. OF COM., Jun. 4, 1990, at 8A;
John Burgess, Norton's Defense: The British are Bad, But the French Have a Better Deal, WASH.
POST, May 2, 1990, at G3.
43 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851
(1988).
44 The definition of national security under the free trade agreement is limited to
defense production, war, and nuclear proliferation. Id.
45 For a discussion of U.S. bilateral investment treaties see, Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201 (1988).
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to prevailing international law doctrines and agreements, most nota-
bly the GAT'.. Although the U.S. is a member of the GATT and has
been a leader in nearly every GAIT round, the U.S. Senate has
never ratified the GAT-. 46  Congressional commitment to the
GATT is often questioned. 47 Legislators continually deride this in-
stitution, referring to it pejoratively as the Gentlemans' Agreement
to Talk and Talk.48 Given this attitude, it is not surprising that the
U.S. has a two-sided view of GATT obligations. We are content to
bring issues before GATT panels on opening markets for American
goods but decline to accord the same respect to foreign complaints
on U.S. trade practices.
The U.S. has blocked the adoption of several GAT panel re-
ports critical of U.S. trade policies. By blocking these reports and
disregarding our GATT obligations, the U.S. undermines its com-
mitment to multilateral trade negotiations. Most recently, the U.S.
blocked a GATT panel report concerning discriminatory practices in
U.S. government procurement. 49 An EC manufacturer of sonar
mapping equipment, Atlas Electronik, was the leading candidate to
sell sonar mapping equipment to the National Science Foundation.
At the request of SenatorJohn Kerry (D-Mass.), Senator Barbara Mi-
kulski (D-Md.) inserted a line item into the appropriations legislation
governing the National Science Foundation. 50 The provision stated
that no appropriations "may be obligated for procurement of a mul-
tibeam bathymetric sonar mapping system manufactured outside of
the United States."' The carefully crafted line item was designed to
steer the procurement award away from the European manufacturer
and favor an American producer, Seabeam of Massachusetts.
After Atlas Electronik complained to EC trade officials, the EC
brought its complaint pursuant to GATT. The U.S. argued that
"since the purchase took place in the context of the provision of an
extensive range of services, it [the sale] should not be considered as
46 "The GAIT is an executive agreement never ratified by the Senate under the
constitution." H.Rep. No. 98-287, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., part I, at 22 (1983); Protocol of
Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. pts. 5, 6, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
47 For example, the legislative history of the Trade Act of 1974 observes that
although funds have been appropriated to cover U.S. GATT expenses, this appropriation
"does not imply approval or disapproval by the Congress of all articles of the GAT." See
H.R. Rep. No. 1644, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, at 27 (1974) (reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7367, 7373).
48 U.S. May Go Outside GA TT Framework for Trade Talks if LDCs Continue to Balk, Yeutter
Says, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1461, 1465 (1985).
49 EC Commission 'Welcomes' GA7TT Report on Buy-American; U.S. Blocks Adoption, INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 865, 871 (1992).
50 Greg Rushford, A Senator's Favor Unleoshes Trade Disputes, LEGAL TIMES, June 1,
1992, at 1, 22.
5' Id.
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covered by the GPA. ' ' 52 A GATT panel on April 23, 1992 deter-
mined that the U.S. procurement action violated the GATT. The
panel urged that the U.S. "conduct the proposed procurement con-
sistently with its obligations under the Agreement on Government
Procurement.' 5
Although the transaction in question was only valued at $2.4
million, the U.S. blocked adoption of the panel report because it
"raises fundamental questions about the way certain U.S. govern-
ment contracts are awarded." 54  European Community officials
quickly exploited the actions by the U.S., stating "This confirms what
we have often said in the past that although the Americans claim to
be opening contracts there are a great many exceptions .... The
result is that they are doing a lot less than they claim." 55
The Sonar mapping dispute came on the heels of a successful
U.S. ruling by the GATT concerning EC oilseeds subsidies. A
GATT panel ruled in March 1992 that EC subsidies on oilseeds vio-
lated the GATT. 56 As part of an effort to get the EC to accept the
panel report, the administration has threatened $1 billion in retalia-
tory tariffs on the EC.57 Interestingly enough, the U.S. also recently
won a GATT panel dispute against Norway involving Norwegian
government procurement.58
Mexico, another close U.S. trading partner, has also successfully
brought a U.S. action to a GAT panel only to have the report ig-
nored by the U.S. The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act 59 pro-
hibits the importation of tuna caught by driftnet fishing, which kills
dolphins. Mexican tuna fleets asserted that this ecological standard
was an impermissible trade barrier violative of the GATT. 60 A
GATT panel concurred with the Mexican position, which was also
supported by the EC.61 The U.S. not only ignored the panel report
52 U.S., E. C. Clash on Diference Between Products and Services, UPI, May 15, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file.
53 Rushford, supra note 50, at 23.
54 See GATT Government Procurement Agreement -*Report of a Panel on the United States Pro-
curement of a Sonar Mapping Systems, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES RAPID,
May 15, 1992.
55 E.C. Slams U.S. for Blocking GATT Panel Report, REUTER LIBRARY REP., May 14, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file.
56 U.S. to Proceed with Sanctions Against EC over Oilseeds Dispute if No Offer Received, 9 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 955, 961 (1992).
57 Id.
58 GATT Panel Rules in Favor of U.S. on Norway's Procurement of Toll Equipment, 9 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 911, 940 (1992).
59 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.S. § 1361, et. seq. See, Report on United
States Trade Barriers and Unfair Practices, Services of the Commission of the European Com-
munities (1991), at 13; Register of United States Barriers to Trade, External Affairs and Interna-
tional Trade Canada (1992), at 14.
60 U.S. Comes Under Pressure Over Tuna Embargo, REUTER Bus. REP., Apr. 30, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file.
61 Id.
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but also introduced a resolution that no international agreement that
"jeopardizes U.S. health, safety, labor or environmental laws" 62 will
receive Congressional approval. In light of this legislation and the
precarious position of the proposed North American Free Trade
Agreement 63 the Mexican government did not threaten retaliation or
push the U.S. further on the panel report.
Mexico and the EC are not the only U.S. trading partners to suc-
cessfully challenge U.S. trade barriers at the GATT and have the
subsequent panel report ignored. Canada asserted that state taxes
on beer and wine imports were discriminatory and violated the
GAT '.64 A GATT panel determined that tax benefits were unfairly
bestowed on U.S. brewers by the federal government and some forty
states. Canadian complaints that the U.S. practice of forcing beer
exporters to distribute via wholesalers instead of retailers also were
supported by the GATT panel. 65 Although the panel report was
supported by the EC, Australia and Canada, the U.S. blocked its
adoption.66
Perhaps the most significant example of the U.S. blocking a
GATT panel report concerns Section 33767 and U.S. actions against
infringing imports. Despite the size of the U.S. trade deficit, the U.S.
remains the largest exporter of copyrighted and patented material.
Recognizing the importance of this market, the U.S. is zealous in its
attempts to protect intellectual property overseas and domestically.
Internationally, the U.S. relies on Section 30168 to safeguard intel-
lectual property.
Domestically, Section 337 has been the weapon of choice for
U.S. manufacturers to protect U.S. patents, copyrights and trade-
marks by barring pirated goods from entering the United States.
Challenges involving patent, copyright or trademark infringement
are typically brought in U.S. federal court. However, when imports
are asserted to infringe U.S. intellectual property, Section 337 is a
superior weapon for the domestic producer. Pursuant to statute,
Section 337 investigations must be completed within one year or, in
"more complicated cases," within eighteen months. 69 Thus, a com-
pany complaining of patent infringement is assured of a quicker re-
sult at the ITC than in most courts.
62 H.R. Con. Res. 246, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 1991.
63 See U.S. Recession will not Impede NAFTA: Negroponte, NOTIMEX MEXICAN NEWS SER-
VICE, Feb. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file.
64 Peter Morton, Canada Wins Round in Beer War as GA 7T Rules U.S. 'Unfair', FIN. POST,
May 1, 1992, at 3.
65 Id.
66 Canada Presses for Adoption of GATT Panel Report on U.S. Beer Taxes, Decision Delayed, 9
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 781, 793 (1992).
67 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
68 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
69 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
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Furthermore, Section 337 actions are in rem actions against the
infringing goods themselves. 70 Personal jurisdiction does not need
to be established over the foreign exporter of the goods as in federal
court. Additionally, a successful petitioner at the ITC gains the ben-
efit of a government-enforced order in which the U.S. Customs Ser-
vice bars offending products from entering the United States.
Traditional forums such as judicial courts do not offer such enforce-
ment assistance. Moreover, the ITC provides a user-friendly envi-
ronment for prospective plaintiffs. 7' The Trade Remedy Assistance
Office at the Commission offers technical guidance and legal advice
to small businesses bringing Section 337 actions. 72
Section 337 is a broad sword in the battle against "unfair prac-
tices in import trade."" s It has been used in cases involving antitrust
violations, product disparagement and the theft of trade secrets. For
example, in 1988, Aunyx, an American manufacturer of photocopier
toner, charged Japan-based Canon with unfair trade practices. 74
Aunyx alleged that Canon was disparaging its products in an attempt
to monopolize the toner industry. An administrative law judge at
the ITC ruled that Canon had violated Section 337 by engaging in
unfair acts and competition in the importation and sale of toner.75
Section 337 gives domestic manufacturers a tremendous advan-
tage against infringing imports as compared to actions against do-
mestic thieves of intellectual property. In 1988, a GATT panel ruled
that Section 337 violates the GATT principle of national treatment,
yet the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) blocked adoption of the
report.76 In November 1989, the USTR withdrew its blocking of the
panel report although the U.S. disagreed with the result.7 7 When
the U.S. adopted the report, U.S. Ambassador to the GATT Rufus
Yerkza cautioned "[tihe contracting parties (GATT member states)
should be aware that our ability to obtain appropriate legislation
amending Section 337 will be maximized in the context of legislation
implementing the results of the Uruguay Round .... ,,78
70 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
71 See William H. Lash, III, New Use for Old Trade Law,J. OF COM., Oct. 24, 1991, at 8A.
72 See Annual Report 1990, USITC Pub. 2354, Dec. 31, 1990; See also Lash, supra note
71, at 8A.
73 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
74 In re Certain Electrically Resistive Monocomponent Toner and 'Black Powder' Preparations
Therefor, USITC Pub. 2069, Inv. No. 337-TA-253 (1988).
75 According to the judge, these acts tended to restrain or monopolize trade and
commerce in the United States. Id. Although the ITC later reversed this decision, the
application of Section 337 to an antitrust case illustrated the statute's broad reach.
76 U.S. Continues to Block GATT Section 337 Report to Allow Further Study, Hills Says, 6
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1005, 1024 (1989).
77 GATT Council Adopts Dispute Panel Reports on U.S. Section 337, Korea Beef Quotas, 6
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1461, 1466 (1989).
78 U.S. Bows to GATT Finding Against Patent Laws, REUTERS, Nov. 7, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file.
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B. Abuses Under Section 301
Another area where the U.S. gleefully abandons GATT princi-
ples of multilateral negotiation in favor of unilateral trade actions is
retaliatory action under Section 301.79 Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 provides for retaliatory actions against foreign states that
deny U.S. rights under international trade agreements, or unjustifi-
ably burden or restrict U.S. commerce.80 Some of the weapons in
the arsenal of the USTR include the suspension or withdrawal of
previously granted trade agreement concessions, the imposition of
retaliatory tariffs or the setting of quotas on imports from the offend-
ing state.8' The USTR has other options available. Pursuant to Sec-
tion 301, the USTR is also authorized to "enter into binding
agreements" with foreign countries to eliminate the questionable
practice or policy which burdens or restricts the U.S. 8 2 These agree-
ments may also provide the U.S. with compensatory trade benefits
which need not necessarily benefit the aggrieved industry. If the
"provision of such trade benefits is not feasible," another industry
may be the recipient of the benefits.83
No discussion of Section 301 can be undertaken without an anal-
ysis of the practices that are subject to complaint by the statute.
Under Section 301, an act is "unreasonable" if it is "unfair and ineq-
uitable."' 84 Actions by foreign states that are not violations of the
international legal rights of the U.S. may nonetheless be character-
ized as "unreasonable." Another consideration in the determination
of what constitutes an unreasonable practice is whether the U.S. of-
fers foreign nationals reciprocal opportunities.85
Section 301 also is designed to deter and punish "unjustifiable"
practices which burden or restrict U.S. commerce. 86 An unjustifiable
practice is one that is in violation of or is inconsistent with the inter-
national legal rights of the United States. 87 Policies that deny U.S.
firms national treatment in trade, service or investment or fail to pro-
tect U.S. intellectual property are by statute "unjustifiable."18 8 Most
typically complained of under Section 301 are those practices which
deny U.S. firms access to foreign markets, opportunity for direct in-
vestment, or adequate protection of intellectual property. However,
Section 301 sanctions may also be imposed on states that violate
79 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1989).
80 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
81 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(I)(A)-(B) (1988).
82 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(C) (1988).
83 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(4)(A) (1988).
84 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A) (1988).
85 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(D) (1988).
86 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B) (1988).
87 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(4)(A) (1988).
88 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(4)(B) (1988).
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workers' rights or states that engage in export targeting.8 9
The United States Trade Representative annually compiles an
"estimate report on foreign trade barriers". 9 ° This report is submit-
ted to the President, the Senate Finance Committee and committees
of the House of Representatives. It is typically the most eagerly
awaited report by the Washington D.C. international trade bar. This
directory of foreign barriers to U.S. trade is the fodder from which
Section 301 targets are selected. In fact, the number of pages de-
voted to a country serves as an indicator of the likelihood that the
state will be named a Section 301 target.9 '
Given the power and political pressure that surround the Sec-
tion 301 process, the need for accurate information is obvious.
However, the information gathering process for the National Trade
Estimate (NTE) reports is clumsy at best. In compiling the report,
the USTR solicits information from U.S. embassies abroad, the De-
partments of Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, State, Labor, and
Justice, as well as the National Security Council, the Council of Eco-
nomic advisers and the Office of Management and Budget.9 2 How-
ever, private sector advisory committees also contribute information
to the USTR for the purposes of the report. 93 Thus, corporations
and individuals who stand to benefit directly from the finding or ex-
aggeration of foreign trade barriers are also relied upon for informa-
tion in determining the existence and impact of these barriers.
One fundamental issue of concern with the report is the deter-
mination of what exactly constitutes a trade barrier. According to
the report, foreign trade barriers fall into eight distinct categories.
94
Included in this litany are "government-imposed measures and poli-
cies that restrict, prevent, or impede the international exchange of
goods and services." 95 The lists of practices defined as barriers in
the NTE reports are too numerous to mention here. However, it is
notable that the report and the threat of a Section 301 trade sanction
is often used as a bludgeon by U.S. manufacturers to gain access to
markets that are closed as a matter of national policy.
For example, the USTR listed India's practice of not opening its
lucrative insurance markets to foreign (meaning U.S.) insurers. 96 In
fact, all insurance policies in the $3 billion Indian market are issued
by two state-operated firms: General Insurance Co. of India and Life
89 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1988).
90 Pursuant to § 141 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by § 303 of the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984 and § 1304 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
91 E.g., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1992 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers (1992) (giving Japan twenty pages of attention).
92 Id. at 1.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1-2.
95 Id. at 1.
96 No Sanctions on India Trade, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1990, at D6.
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Insurance Co. of India. 97 Not even Indian nationals may sell insur-
ance in this market.98 Where is the discrimination or unfair trade
practice in this market? Moreover, why should the Indian govern-
ment be forced to extend a privilege to U.S. insurers that it will not
offer its own people?
The USTR also assailed India's restrictive practices of foreign
direct investment. Foreign investment in India may only control
40% of the equity in an Indian venture unless the firm is engaged in
technology transfer or produces solely for export.99 After an investi-
gation, USTR Hills determined onJune 14, 1990 that India's regula-
tions of the insurance market are "unreasonable and burden or
restrict U.S. commerce."' 00 India has refused to negotiate under a
threat of U.S. retaliatory trade sanctions. Indeed, Indian Commerce
Minister Arun Nehru commented that "[t]hreats of retaliation are
things of the medieval past. We don't negotiate under threat."'' 1
New Delhi lawmakers were united in their refusal to bow to "U.S.
blackmail" and stood fast to protect Indian sovereignty from U.S.
pressure.
The action by the USTR is amazingly short-sighted. India is an
acknowledged leader in the Third World, particularly in the Uruguay
GATT rounds. The U.S. has repeatedly pushed for increased pro-
tection of intellectual property during this round and the lesser-de-
veloped countries are the main opponents of a GATT agreement on
the protection of such rights. Given this situation, is it prudent to
pressure and alienate India on insurance issues when Indian assist-
ance is absolutely crucial on the much more significant issue of
world-wide protection of intellectual property? USTR Hills, all too
aware of India's role in the Third World "hoped that they [third
world states] would understand our explanation of the profound
problems we have had with respect to India."' 02 Although these
states may "understand" the U.S. explanation of its treatment of In-
dia, it does not necessarily follow that they will accept this answer.
Other developing states will obviously infer that if India, the world's
largest democracy and a Third-World leader can be treated so brus-
quely, they have little hope for better treatment from the USTR.
A similarly short-sighted view has been taken regarding South
Korea. When South Korea was a developing country under the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (GSP), and not a competitor for U.S.
97 Karen Riley, Bush Will Be Buddy, Not Bully to Japan, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1990, at
B5.
98 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 91, at 119.
99 K.K. Sharma, India Attracts More Foreign Investment, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1989, at 4.
100 Super 301 Sanctions Judged Inappropriate, World Insurance Report, FIN. TIMES, June
22, 1990.
101 India Rebufs U.S. Trade Sanction Threat, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1990, at D5.
102 Names India Again for Insurance Investment Issues, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 614 (May
2, 1990).
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products, retaliatory trade actions against Seoul would have been un-
thinkable. Now that South Korea has graduated from the GSP and is
exporting capital as well as high technology goods, it has come
under the spiteful gaze of the USTR. South Korea faced retaliatory
actions in 1989 despite the political instability facing this keystone in
the Pacific Rim.103 Even though U.S. direct investment in Korea was
$1.9 billion in 1989,104 and was continuing to grow, the USTR was
not satisfied with this progress and Korea became a target of a Super
301 investigation under the 1988 Trade Act. 10 5 Korean investment
law required that local equity be in place in many ventures. 10 6 In
response to U.S. pressures, Korea has made progress in opening its
market to foreign direct investment.10 7
Another example of the unfair targeting of a nation's domestic
practices may be seen in the case of the Thailand cigarette market.
In Thailand, all cigarettes are manufactured by the state tobacco mo-
nopoly.' 08 Despite the inability of Thai citizens and companies to
sell cigarettes, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, Phillip Morris
and the Cigarette Exporters's Association (CEA) felt aggrieved by
their inability to enter this market as the U.S. market was shrink-
ing.109 The Thai cigarette market was valued at $744 million and the
estimated American share of this market was $166 million. 0 Bol-
stered by past successes in using Section 301 to pry open markets in
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, the CEA brought a Section 301 ac-
tion against Thailand and the Thailand Tobacco Monopoly."I'
Opposition to this trade action came from the American Medical
Association (AMA) as well as other federal agencies. Surgeon Gen-
eral C. Everett Koop has compared the addictive nature of tobacco
to that of heroin." 12 Hirayama Takeshi, Director of the Tokyo Insti-
1O See Talking Loudly and Carrying a Crowbar, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 1989, at 23. See
also Brooks, A "Super 301" Ruling Too Early For Seoul And Taipei, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
REP., Backgrounder No. 91, May 25, 1989.
104 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1991 National Trade Estimate Report on For-
eign Trade Barriers 139 (1991).
105 Hills Hardline on Trade Draws Protest in S. Korea, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1989, at D6.
106 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1989 National Trade Estimate Report on For-
eign Trade Barriers 122 (1989).
107 Korea has agreed to revise or eliminate many of its discriminatory practices as part
of the bilateral "Super 301" agreement of 1989. Many provisions have already been ful-
filled, and the remaining liberalizations will be implemented in 1991, 1992, and 1993.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1992 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers 165 (1992).
108 Peter Unghphakorn, U.S. Cigarette Export Habit Hard to Break, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1990.
109 U.S. Initiates Unfair Trade Case Against Thai Barriers to U.S. Cigarette Exports, DAILY REP.
FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA),June 1, 1989, at A-7.
110 U.S. Initiates Section 301 Investigation of Thailand's Barriers to U.S. Cigarettes, 6 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 731 (1989).
III Id. at n.13.
112 Christine Tierney, Cigarette Row Heats Up As U.S. Seeks Asia Markets, REUTERS, Aug.
18, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file.
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tute of Oncology, analogized foreign cigarette promotions to " 'the
old B-29 bombings' of World War II.' '113 Ted Chen, Executive Sec-
retary of the Asian Pacific Association for the Control of Tobacco
and professor of public health at the University of Massachusetts,
similarly noted "Washington's pressure amounts to nothing less
than a new Opium War." 114 A study by the General Accounting Of-
fice in May 1990 stated "U.S. policy and programs for assisting the
export of tobacco and tobacco products work at cross purposes to
U.S. health policy and initiatives, both domestically and internation-
ally."" 15 The report noted the inherent contradiction of using a fed-
eral agency to promote cigarette exports while the U.S. is a leader in
the international anti-smoking movement.
The Thai government opposed the petition asserting that im-
ports were restricted as a health and consumer measure designed to
control smoking by Thais. Numerous members of Congress also op-
posed the petition. The Tobacco Export Reform Act" 6 was intro-
duced as a sign of congressional dissatisfaction with the tobacco
industry."17 This act will require that tobacco firms export U.S.
health standards and warning restrictions as well as cigarettes."18
Tobacco growers who sell leaf tobacco to Thailand also expressed
their dissatisfaction with the Section 301 petition which they felt
might threaten their sales to Thailand." 19
The GATT panel found that the Thai restrictions violated
GATT.120 Despite the ruling, the split between the USTR and Con-
gress remained. Thirty-three members of Congress, representing
both political parties, sponsored the Cigarette Export Reform Act of
1991.121 This bill prohibits the use of U.S. funds for U.S. trade
agencies in any negotiations seeking the removal or reduction of re-
strictions on advertising or sales of tobacco products. Similarly, the
Cigarette Export Labeling Act 122 requires exporters of cigarettes to
113 See Michael Levin, U.S. Tobacco Firms Push Eagerly into Asian Market, MARKETING
NEWS, Jan. 21, 1991, at 2. See also Dr. Alistair Brewis, Letter: Advertising that Recruits New
Smokers, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 30, 1991, at 17.
114 Tierney, supra note 112.
115 Renu Sehgal, Curb Sought on US Aid to Tobacco Firms, BOSTON GLOBE,July 7, 1991, at
9.
116 135 CONG. REC. E640 (1989).
117 Alexander Cockburn, Getting Opium to the Masses: The Political Economy of Addiction;
U.S. Tobacco Companies's Asian Campaigns, Information Access Company, Nation Enterprises,
Vol. 249, No. 14, at 482 (Oct. 30, 1989); Colman McCarthy, Koop and the Cigarette Hustlers,
WASH. POST, at Fl, June 25, 1989; Selling Cigarettes Overseas: Push or Pull?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 26, 1989, at 20.
118 135 CONG. REC. E640 (1989).
119 William H. Lash, III, Burning Bridges with Cigarettes,J. OF COM., Feb. 14, 1992, at 4A.
120 USCEA Says Thailand Cigarette Import Ban Is Lifted; U.S. Cigarette Products Available to
Thai Smokers, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
121 Cigarette Export Reform Act, H.R. 2781, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
122 Cigarette Export Labeling Act, H.R. 2779, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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make warnings similar to those on U.S. cigarettes.' 23
The latest effort by U.S. tobacco manufacturers to penetrate for-
eign markets by using Section 301 marks the return of the USTR to
Taiwan's cigarette market. The United States is trying to block a
Taiwanese bill that would strengthen warning labels on cigarettes,
prohibit cigarette vending machines and ban all advertising and pro-
motion of cigarettes.' 24 The Taiwanese bill is non-discriminatory; it
would apply to domestic cigarettes as well as imports. This, how-
ever, did not stop U.S. manufacturers from opposing it with the
assistance of the USTR.12 5
The Thailand example and other cigarette cases illustrate a cru-
cial question in U.S. trade policy. If the U.S. is to engage in market
opening practices of questionable validity under international law
and run the risk of trade war, should there be a semblance of consen-
sus? Does the cigarette, a product of dubious benefit, merit retalia-
tion from our trading partners, especially in light of the opposition
from U.S. parties with no trade agenda, such as the AMA and Sur-
geon General?
Cigarettes are not the only health threatening items that the
USTR has been willing to wage war to protect. Under Section 301,
the USTR investigated the ban on imports of hormone-treated beef
by the European Community. European Community directive
146/88126 bans the sale of hormone-treated meats, regardless of
their origin. The EC directive was not discriminatory and had a le-
gitimate goal of protecting the health of EC citizens. Not satisfied by
this claim, congressional sabre rattlers determined that this was a
trade barrier aimed at the U.S. beef industry. In January 1989, the
USTR imposed 100% tariffs on EC exports of pasta, Italian juices,
tomato paste, pork products, tomato sauce and other goods in retali-
ation.' 27 The EC threatened to impose similar tariff sanctions on
U.S. exports of walnuts and dried fruits.' 28
123 For a good description of the use of Section 301 in support of the Tobacco Indus-
try, see Fred H. Jones, U.S. Tobacco Goes Abroad: Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act as a Toolfor
Achieving Access to Foreign Tobacco Markets, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 439 (1989);
Suthiphon Thaveechaiyagarn, Current Developments: The Section 301 Cigarette Case Against
Thailand-a Thai Perspective, 21 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 367-87 (1990).
124 Lash, supra note 119.
125 This action was met by a demonstration from health care leaders. See Annie
Huang, Taiwan Pushes Ban on U.S. Tobacco Ads; Trade: Health Officials and Lawmakers Say Amen-
can Firms Are Seducing Teens into Smoking. A Ban May Take Effect This Week, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 27,
1992, at D3. David Yen, President of the John Tung Foundation illustrated that this was a
health, not a trade dispute: "We want our American friends to know that they can sell us
more automobiles or blue jeans, but not harmful cigarettes." Id.
126 Council Directive 88/146, art. 5, 1988 O.J. (L 70) (introduced Jan. 1, 1988).
127 USTR Yeutter Confirms U.S. Intention to Retaliate Against EC Meat Hormone Ban, DAILY
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Dec. 28, 1988, at A-6.
128 U.S., EEC Officials Meet over Farm Subsidy Disagreements, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1I, 1989,
Bus. section, at 10. House Panel Chairmen Consider Plan to Block Sale of EC Food Products to U.S.
Military, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 359 (1989).
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The U.S. trade sanctions were not fully supported by Americans.
American consumer groups supported the EC ban on hormone-
treated beef, viewing it as an issue of consumer protection, not trade
protection. The Consumer Federation of America and the Commu-
nity Nutrition Institute recognized that " 'individual countries can
make their own decisions' about health policies."' 12 9 These consum-
ers attempted to use the EC ban to gain acceptance of hormone-free
beef in the United States.
The American Meat Institute (AMI), however, was "solidly be-
hind the Bush administrations's efforts to end the unjustified EC hor-
mone ban."' 30 The AMI condemned the sanctions as " .. . a blatant
trade barrier based on economic self-interest and cloaked in the
guise of public health."' 3'1 AMI President Manly Molpus cautioned
"[w]e must stand up for our rights in the international marketplace
... Otherwise, the meat industry will be only the first victim in the
movement toward a protectionist European trade policy."' 3 2
U.S. consumer groups were not alone in their criticism of the
trade sanctions. Texas State Commissioner of Agriculture Hight-
ower approached EC representatives with offers of Texas-supplied
hormone-free beef.'3 3 These Texas overtures were allegedly met
with pressure from the USTR, who feared that internationally coop-
erative state policies might undermine the trade sanctions.
Contrary to the position of the Agriculture Commissioner, the
Texas Cattle Feeders Association maintained support for the trade
sanctions.13 4 Beef industry representatives viewed a successful Sec-
tion 301 sanction as the key to opening beef markets in Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan.' 3 5 The Texas Cattle Feeders, representing 25%
of the U.S. market, predicted the failure of the Hightower plan, cit-
ing a lack of participation by beef producers.' 3 6 The smaller beef
producers, represented by the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Rais-
ers Association joined in the denunciation of the Hightower propo-
sal. Don King, General Manager of the 14,000 member association,
asserted that the Hightower plan "was a tremendous disservice to
129 Consumer Coalition Calls on U.S. to Revoke Sanctions Against EC, Respect Hormone Ban, 6
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 140 (1989) (quoting Ron Leonard of the Community Nutrition
Institute).
130 Id.
13 1 Id.
132 Id.
133 Texas Agriculture Commissioner Hightower Announces Sale of Hormone-Free Beef to EC, 6
INT'L. TRADE REP. (BNA) 1012 (1989).
134 Texas Official Disputes EC Report that U.S. Urged State to Slow Hormone-Free Beef Plan, 6
INT'L. TRADE REP. (BNA) 895 (1989).
I35 Ronald E. Yates, Exporters See Red Over Japanese Beef Quotas, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 21,
1988, section 7, at 3.
136 Texas Official Disputes EC Report that U.S. Urged State to Slow Hormone-Free Beef Plan,
supra note 134, at 895.
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the beef industry."' 137
It is important to note that although these industry groups were
united in expressing their support for trade sanctions, they failed to
focus on a concrete reason for these sanctions. The desire for in-
creased market access in the Pacific Rim fueled the support for the
Section 301 process in the beef industry. The Pacific Rim trade bar-
riers on beef imports were not related to health standards or con-
sumer concerns as was the case in the EC. Trade sanctions for the
Pacific Rim were favored by the beef producers to eliminate quotas
or other barriers barring U.S. beef from entering these markets. No
state by state or producer solution would gain access to these mar-
kets. The beef producers incorrectly surmised that negotiation with
the EC on hormone-free beef would be viewed as a lack of resolve or
a sign of weakness in the Pacific Rim market and would undermine
their attempts to open those markets.13 8
Rather than allow the dispute to explode into full scale trade
war, the EC established a Task Force to address this $100 million
trade dispute.' 3 9 In May 1989, the Task Force developed an interim
solution which provided for the importation of foods with producer
guarantees. By July 31, 1989, the first shipment of Texas hormone-
free beef was sent to the EC. The Texas Department of Agriculture
assisted beef producers in meeting EC certification standards.
Hightower defended the actions of his department and lauded the
work of the Task Force: "It never made sense for the U.S. and Eu-
rope to engage in a trade war over beef standards."' 140 Hightower
concluded "[wie at the Texas Department of Agriculture felt that
more was at stake than steak, and a whole lot more was at stake than
growth hormones."' 4 ' The EC also sought relief at the GATT. On
October 11, 1989, the Chairman of the GAT Council and the Di-
rector General consented to hold informal consultations to solve this
controversy. ' 42
C. Section 301 and Japan Bashing
The Section 301 process most frequently has been targeted at
Japanese business and trade practices. Since Commodore Perry and
his gunboats opened Japan's markets to the U.S. in 1845, U.S. trade
policies with Japan have been fraught with coercion. The Japanese
137 Id. at 896.
138 Id. at 895.
139 Little Progress Made by Hormone Task Force as Deadline Nears, USTR Official Indicates, 6
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 763 (1989).
140 Texas Agriculture Commissioner Hightower Announces Sale of Hormone-Free Beef to EC, supra
note 134, at 895.
141 Id.
142 GATT Sets Up Flexible Mechanism Against Anti-Trade Acts, XINHUA GENERAL SERVICES
NEWS, Oct. 1I, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
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engage in a number of restrictive trade practices. In the 1989 Na-
tional Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE), prepared by
the USTR, a full seventeen pages were dedicated to highlighting un-
fair Japanese trade practices.143 Some of the trade practices com-
plained of include legitimate concerns such as Japanese policies
forbidding imports of rice,' 44 failure to protect intellectual property,
and restrictions on foreign direct investment.' 45 Yet the sheer vol-
ume of attention dedicated to Japanese trade practices indicates that
many of the complaints asserted are mere "nit-picking". For exam-
ple, the 1989 NTE complains of Japanese restrictions on "high cube
containers" used on the roadways by U.S. shipping lines.' 4 6 Prior to
the mid-1980's, these high cube containers were not permitted on
Japanese roadways. In 1987, Japan allowed these containers on cer-
tain routes. Unsatisfied by this partial access, U.S. shippers complain
that the route application process is a costly and burdensome trade
barrier. In response to this reasonable request by the U.S. shipping
industry, U.S. agencies continue to monitor this "vital" concern. 147
Another identified Japanese trade barrier concerns the establish-
ment of large retail stores. The Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) administers the Japanese Large Retail
Store Law,' 48 which was intended to require only MITI notification
of the opening of a large retail store. It is asserted that MITI has
now converted this notification process into a process of approval.' 49
As a condition of MITI approval, store owners must obtain a consen-
sus with local merchants before the facility may be opened.' 5 0 Alleg-
edly, the law has been subverted and is now heavily slanted in favor
of local merchants, with consumer interests being no factor in the
process. Critics of the process maintain that it delays and restricts
the establishment of large retail stores.
Nevertheless, this process is aimed at all retailers and there has
been no demonstration that U.S. retailers face discrimination in this
area. Where is the "unfair" international trade barrier? The barrier
is at best an indirect one. According to the NTE report, large retail-
ers provide opportunities for imports from the U.S.; therefore, a bur-
den on these retailers will adversely impact U.S. exporters.' 5 ' The
143 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1989 National Trade Estimate Report on For-
eign Trade Barriers 139 (1989).
144 See Paul C. Rosenthal, A Lose-Lose Trade Bargain?; How the Democrats Could Turn GATT
into a Hot Campaign Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1992, at C3.
145 Id.
146 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1989 National Trade Estimate Report on For-
eign Trade Barriers (1989).
147 Id.
148 Large Retail Store Law Hard to Abolish, Matsunaga Says, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Feb.
23, 1990.
149 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 91, at 113.
150 Id.
151 See id.
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NTE report fails to quantify "damages" to U.S. exporters. Nonethe-
less, the U.S. pushed Japan to shorten the processing time on retail
store applications. The Japanese Administrative Reform Council
recommended certain changes to speed the approval process. 15 2
Japan was named as a target of a Super 301 action for barriers to
supercomputers, satellites and forest products in May 1989. Hiroshi
Mitsuzuka, Director of MITI, echoed the response of India and
stated that " [t]he government of Japan has no intention of entering
into negotiations with the United States under the conditions im-
posed under Super 301."15 However, the Japanese indicated that
they would participate in discussions of these trade practices in an
international multilateral forum, such as the GAFF, but not within
the unilateral framework of Super 301. The Japanese Foreign Minis-
try stated that if the U.S. retaliated under Super 301, they might
bring an action against the U.S. at the GATIT. 54
Understandably, theJapanese began to assert that the Super 301
action was a smokescreen by the U.S. to shift blame for the trade
imbalance onto Japanese practices instead of U.S. domestic
problems. Then Foreign Minister Sousuke Uno cautioned that fur-
ther tactics by the U.S. might make relations between the two coun-
tries "severely strained."' 15 5 Takeshi Isayama, Director of the
Americas and Oceania Division at MITI, similarly assailed the Super
301 action and predicted that "[tihe decision will backfire ongoing
efforts [in Japan] to improve bilateral trade relations, and certainly
will be counterproductive on both sides." 156 Mr. Isayama stated that
Japan will challenge the process in multinational forums like the Or-
-ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as
the GATT. 157
The singling out of Japan for this unilateral treatment is even
more curious given the nature of the allegations. For example, the
U.S. asserted that the Japanese supercomputer market was closed to
U.S. manufacturers as a result of large discounting by Japanese pro-
ducers.' 5 8 The Japanese pointed out that U.S. sales of computers in
Japan were rising and thatJapanese firms had committed to purchase
152 Id. at 113-14.
153 Japan Irate Over U.S. Trade Charges, Won't Negotiate; Threatens to Sue Over Sanctions,
L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1989, at AI.
154 Id. Japan committed to liberalize Large Scale Retail Store Laws in an Interim Re-
port (Apr. 5, 1990) and ajoint Report (June 28, 1990) issued by Japan and the U.S. 1991
Trade Policy Agenda and 1990 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade
Agreements Program, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D.C., at 58.
155 Unfair Trade Procedure: Japan Rejects Bilateral Negotiations with U.S. Under Super 301
Provision, 6 I'rr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 686 (1989).
156 International Trade: Top MITI Official Says U.S. Super 301 Action Could Lead to Erosion of
Relations, 108 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), at A-5 (June 7, 1989).
157 Id.
158 Steven Brull, Japan, United States Reach Basic Accord on Supercomputers, REUTER Bus.
REP., Mar. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Busrpt file.
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supercomputers from the U.S. '5 9 The allegations of unfair Japanese
trade practices in the government procurement of supercomputers
was further challenged by Takuma Yamamoto, chairman of the Japan
Electronic Industry Development Association. Mr. Yamamoto ob-
served that no Japanese supercomputer had ever been purchased by
any U.S. government agency and dismissed the unfair trade practices
as "nonsense and irrational."' 60
An even more irrational attempt to coerce Japan in the name of
free trade came in the spring of 1992. Senator McConnell of Ken-
tucky noticed that the thoroughbred horse market in his state was
flagging. With a shortage of investment bankers and oil sheiks to
purchase this costly but "vital export," he turned his eye to Japan.
McConnell asserted that the import duties on race horses in Japan
were a trade barrier.' 6 ' According to the Senator, "[t]he govern-
ment of Japan has put up a web of import duties, quantitative restric-
tions, and non-tariff barriers. A system has been created which
encourages the import of foreign horses for breeding purposes, but
discriminates against horses imported for racing purposes."'1 6 2 The
questionable validity of these allegations is not surprising. However,
when the USTR "expressed support"' 63 for the McConnell propo-
sal, she joined in an attempt to legitimize this trivial demand.
The ludicrous uses of Section 301 againstJapanese practices are
particularly puzzling in light of the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission report evaluating the viability of a U.S.-Japan Free Trade
Agreement.164 It is inconceivable to discuss the possibility of a Free
Trade-Agreement with a party that you are so often harassing with
Section 301. The true impetus for this study was former Ambassa-
dor to Japan Mansfield, who earlier observed an erosion in U.S.-Ja-
pan relations. The vast majority of the witnesses in the ITC
investigation agreed with Ambassador Mansfield that "the present
methods of handling trade disputes engender some degree of bitter-
ness and frustration on both sides of the Pacific."' 65
159 Unfair Trade Practices: Japan Rejects Bilateral Negotiation With U.S. Under Super 301 Pro-
vision, 6 INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 686 (1989).
160 See id.
161 Japan: U.S. to Ask Government to Horse-Trade on Thoroughbred Racing, 9 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 582 (1992).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Pros and Cons of Initiating Negotiations with Japan to Explore
the Possibility of a U.S. -Japan Free Trade Agreement, USITC Pub. 2120, Inv. No. TA-332-255
(Sept. 1988). The ITC Section 332 study was undertaken at the request of Senator Lloyd
Bentsen, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, on behalf of Senator Robert Byrd,
Senate Majority Leader.
165 Trade Policy: Experts Pessimistic That U.S. -Japan FTA Would Solve Trade Woes, ITC Report
Says, 184 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Sept. 22, 1988, at A-i 1. TheJapanese Minis-
try of International Trade and Industry began a similar study of a bilateral US-Japan Free
Trade Agreement after a request by Senator Robert Byrd to Prime Minister Takeshita. Id.
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D. Section 301 and China
The haphazard uses and abuses of Section 301 are best evi-
denced by the Administration's treatment of China. During the sum-
mer of 1991, Congress and the Administration debated the
extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) status to China. President
Bush claimed that MFN "is a means to bring the influence of the
outside world to bear on China."' 66 Only a few months later, the
USTR announced the initiation of a Section 301 investigation of un-
fair Chinese trade practices. The practices subject to investigation
included: import restrictions and quotas; import licensing require-
ments; testing and certification standards and a lack of transparency
in import trade policies and rulings.167 Thus, within the span of only
a few months, the Administration drastically altered its trade policy
towards China. If trade with China is such an important method of
maintaining human rights and other pressures on China, one must
wonder if the Section 301 process is the best manner of accomplish-
ing this goal. How can the Administration hope to influence Chinese
domestic policies while threatening them with trade war? Addition-
ally, one must question the mercurial tendencies of an Administra-
tion that seeks to bestow MFN trade status one month and then
moves to the brink of retaliation so quickly.
E. New "Fair Trade" Legislation-Reforming Section 301 ?
Super 301 expired in 1990. Congress, saddened to see its
weapon of choice eliminated, quickly proposed new legislation to
pick up the fallen mantle of the recently departed remedy. The pro-
posed "Fair Trade and Export Expansion Act of 1991", would
amend the Trade Act of 1974 and reincarnate Super 301.168 Under
the proposed legislation "a priority foreign country" is one that rep-
resents 15% or more of the total trade deficit of the United States,
whose practices were identified in the National Trade Estimates, and
who has not engaged in a free trade agreement with the U.S. 169 A
"priority practice" is defined under the bill as a practice described in
the NTE and "is associated with a sectoral deficit (as listed in the
National Trade Estimates) of 5% or more of the balance of trade
between the United States and the foreign country .... ,,170 The
proposed Super 301 would also remove discretion of the President
concerning the targeting of priority countries.
166 Excerpts from Bush's Reports on China, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1991, at A8.
167 See China: Chinese Trade Official Asks U.S. to End Annual Review of China's MFN Status, 9
INT'L. TRADE REP. (BNA) 359 (1992).
168 S. 301, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
169 Id. § 3 (proposing to amend § 310(a) of Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 2040 by
adding subsec. (e)(i)).
170 Id. § 3 (proposing to amend § 3 10(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, by adding subsec-
tion (e)(2)).
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Not surprisingly, the legislation was condemned by the Japanese
Foreign Ministry. Taizo Watanabe, spokesman for the Japanese For-
eign Ministry, criticized the legislation as "protectionist" and
"against the multinational system of free trade to which the United
States and Japan are committed.' 7 ' Watanabe stated that it was
"inappropriate (for the United States) to lay the blame on its trading
partner"' 72 for the trade imbalance. He pointed to the U.S. budget
deficit and export programs as the "macroeconomic elements"' 73 of
the U.S. trade deficit.
The surprisingly gruff talk by the Japanese Foreign Ministry re-
garding this legislation illustrates another flaw in U.S. trade policy.
Congressional fascination with "tough trade talk" and "prying open
markets with crowbars" ignores U.S. culpability for the trade deficit.
If the federal deficit and trade imbalance is an American, and not an
international problem, why is there not an American solution? The
new legislation assumes that by retaliatory action we can open addi-
tional markets and solve our trade imbalances. The proposed revi-
sions to Super 301 also play directly into the hands ofJapanese trade
officials who assert that the Administration is blaming the trade defi-
cit on other countries instead of looking at American economic ills
such as a low savings rate.' 74
The proposed Fair Trade and Expansion Act is not the lone
Congressional initiative to force open foreign markets. New legisla-
tion has been introduced to strengthen and amend Section 301. The
newest leading contender for this dubious distinction is The Trade
Expansion Act of 1992, H.R. 5100.175 This bill revitalizes the spec-
tra of Super 301 by requiring the USTR to annually identify and tar-
get priority countries, practices and major trade barriers. At the
heart of The Trade Expansion bill is the belief that countries with
substantial trade surpluses and trade barriers should be targeted as
"priority practices under Super 301."176 The legislation also specifi-
cally targets the Japanese Auto market and the keiretsu system.
Under this bill the USTR is directed to investigate Japanese practices
which restrict access of U.S. automobiles and auto parts into the Jap-
anese market. The USTR is also mandated to investigate "all acts,
policies, and practices of Japan, Korea and Taiwan that affect the ac-
cess of U.S. rice and rice products to each of these markets."'1 77
The Trade Expansion Act does not simply focus on the Section
171 Japanese Foreign Ministry Criticizes Congress' Move to Revive Super 301, INT'L TRADE
DAILY (BNA), Oct. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Bnaitd file.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 H.R. 5100, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
176 Id.
177 Id.
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301 process. One of the more protectionist measures in the initial
version of the bill "require[d] the President to negotiate a voluntary
restraint agreement with Japan limiting exports of automobiles and
light trucks to the United States during each of the years 1993
through 1999. ' 178 This controversial provision was deleted from
the bill by the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee on June 10,
1992.179
Other bills that would restore the power of Section 301 include
S.1850.180 This legislation renews the Super 301 test of the 1988
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. A country would be
targeted as a priority country if there were a large number of trade
restraints or a pervasive system of trade barriers, and if the removal
of these barriers would result in increased U.S. exports.""' Similarly,
the Market Opportunity and Reciprocal Enforcement Act,' 8 2 H.R.
3702, would lead to increased retaliatory actions against unfair trad-
ing partners. Another bill, the Trade Agreement Compliance Act, '8 3
would grant "interested persons" the ability to petition the USTR
and seek review of a state's compliance with international trade
agreements.
In addition to violating the spirit of the GATT, shifting the bur-
den for the problems of our economy and being blatantly protection-
ist, Section 301 poses other problems. First and foremost, as
evidenced in the EC hormone-treated beef dispute, it is clear that
Section 301 invites the escalation of retaliatory trade actions. Trade
war mirrors its military counterpart; no one ever truly "wins," and
innocent civilians are injured. The civilians in these disputes are the
importers, exporters and consumers of the products facing higher
tariffs in response to an unfair trade practice in a totally unrelated
area of the economy. The pasta manufacturers in Italy were
threatened by U.S. retaliation for actions in the EC beef industry. In
fact, it may be argued that trade wars are purposefully targeted at
"innocent civilians" in the exporter states. Because the EC does not
export beef to the U.S., meaningful retaliation cannot be aimed at
the European beef industry. Therefore, Section 301 actions are
targeted by necessity at unrelated parties. To make the action even
more powerful, in seeking a target, the U.S. traditionally seeks out an
equivalent value of exports from a vulnerable industry or state.
Thus, in the EC beef-hormone case, the Italian exports of pasta and
178 Id.
179 See Trade Bill Reported to Ways and Means; Limit on Japanese Car Imports Dropped, INT'L
TRADE DAILY (BNA), June 11, 1992.
180 Extension to Period to Identify Trade Liberalization Priorities, S. 1850, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
181 Id.
182 H.R. 3702, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
183 S. 388, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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tomato products were targeted because the Italian economy is more
fragile than the economies of the UK, Germany, France, or the
Netherlands. To return to the military analogy, the U.S. is retaliating
against an attack on a naval base by bombing a foreign orphanage.
An additional problem with Section 301 is its acceptance as a
proper tool of trade policy. Section 301 is contrary to GATT princi-
ples of nondiscrimination and MFN treatment. 84 If the U.S. turns
its back on the multilateral dispute mechanisms of the GATT, it ex-
poses itself to similar attacks from our trading partners. Fifty-one
countries joined in a GAT Council meeting condemning the use of
Section 301 as violative of the GATT in January 1989.185 United
States actions which discriminate against or restrict foreign invest-
ment may be the fuel for a "foreign-designed 301 action" by our
trading partners. The discriminatory methods addressing patent in-
fringement and other intellectual property disputes under Section
337 might similarly provide our partners with grounds for unilateral
sanctions. We are indeed fortunate that our trading partners elect to
seek resolution of these problems in the GATT instead of imitating
our strategies in Section 301. If the U.S. is to remain a valid partner
in the multilateral trading system, Section 301 should be abandoned
and Section 337 should be made consistent with the GAIT.
IV. Abuse In The Antidumping Laws
A. Introduction to Antidumping Law
At the heart of any discussion of U.S. trade law are the an-
tidumping laws. "Dumping" as a term is often used, but seldom
used properly. Even rarer are cases where dumping is properly un-1
derstood. To the non-trade lawyer, increased sales of goods by a
foreign manufacturer "flooding" the U.S. markets are often labelled
as "dumping."' 86 However, under the antidumping laws, dumping
is simply the sale of goods at less-than-fair value (LTFV);' 87 such
sales are at a price that is lower than the price charged by the ex-
porter in his domestic market.' 88 This tactic of price discrimination
is considered to be an unfair trade practice that may injure, or
threaten to injure a domestic industry. Accordingly, when less than
fair value sales are detected, and injury is established, antidumping
184 GATT Article I provides for MFN status. GATT Article II of the Agreement is
violated if the U.S. unilaterally imposes higher duties on imports contrary to the GATT
binding level.
185 Bhagwati, Big Bite Flouts the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1989, at F2.
186 For example, then-President Reagan once defined dumping as "foreigners invad-
ing our market and selling at lower than production costs by government subsidies being
provided to the producers.., in those countries." Remarks During a U.S. Chamber of Congress
Teleconference, Weekly Compilation of Papers of the President, No.19, at 692 (May 10,
1983).
187 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Part I, Art. VI, t 1.
188 Jacob Viner, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923).
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duties are assessed on the goods imported. The antidumping duties
are designed to make the price charged in the U.S. the same as the
price charged in the exporter's home market. At first blush the en-
tire scheme seems incredibly straightforward and simple. However,
upon examination of the policies behind the dumping laws and the
implementation of these statutes, it becomes clear that something is
certainly amiss.
The first question that must be asked is why do we want U.S.
consumers to pay the higher price of the exporter's market. Does
society benefit by the imposition of dumping duties and the higher
prices of imported goods? Who is ultimately served by the an-
tidumping actions? Certainly not the consumers. Do workers bene-
fit? In some cases, workers are affirmatively injured by the
imposition of dumping duties. The same is true for the U.S. indus-
trial base. The manufacturer of computers now pay a higher price
for component parts such as screens or chips. The true beneficiaries
of the antidumping largesse are bloated industries unwilling to com-
pete globally or the scarecrow-like victims of the debt and leveraged
buy-out (LBO) binges of the 1980s.
B. Development of Antidumping Law
The U.S., Canada, the EC, and Australia are the leading states
that routinely punish dumping of goods.18 9 Each of these states has
a history of protectionism stemming back to the English Corn
laws.190 Dumping is merely a modern extension of this protectionist
sentiment, grounded in economic terms to afford it a modicum of
legitimacy.
In America, the views toward dumping were influenced initially
by the antitrust laws. The Antidumping Act of 1916191 was a crimi-
nal act, and sanctioned anyone importing articles into the United
States:
[A]t a price substantially less than the actual market value or whole-
sale price... Provided, that such act or acts be done with the intent
of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of
preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or
of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in
such articles in the United States. 19 ?
The dumping laws were amended to go beyond the antitrust in-
jury envisioned by the 1916 Act. By 1918, the Republicans replaced
the Democratic Congressional majority which supported the 1916
189 See Michael Knoll, Dump our Anti-Dumping Law, Foreign Policy Briefing, The Cato
Institute, No. I I Uuly 25, 1991).
190 See FAY, THE CORN LAws AND SocIAL. ENGLAND (1932).
191 Antidumping Act of 1916, Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C.A. § 72.
192 Id.
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Act. The Tariff Act of 1921195 marked a shift toward protectionism
and away from the more difficult criminal standard of the 1916
Act.194 The Antidumping Act of 1921195 adopted an injury test that
focused more on domestic industry injuries than on injuries to com-
petition. The amendments to the law adopted eased the burden on
the domestic industry by adopting the LTFV standard. 196
The rise of dumping cases coincides with the lowering of tariffs
under multilateral negotiations such as the GATT. As the U.S. low-
ered tariffs under a series of GATT rounds, domestic producers
needed to resort to a series of non-tariff barriers to protect their
market shares. Quotas and voluntary restraint agreements were the
preferred methods of protectionism. Under these non-tariff barriers,
U.S. producers of steel,' 97 automobiles,' 98 and machine tools' 99
have requested successfully that the government negotiate with for-
eign states and manufacturers and limit the importation of these
goods into the United States. However, quotas and voluntary re-
straint agreements are not readily available, particularly to smaller
industries and manufacturers. The cost of obtaining such restraint
must be measured not only in cash but in political capital. It is not
difficult to marshall political consensus to protect the automobile
and steel industries which affect millions of jobs. But the U.S.
urea200 or aspirin20' manufacturers lack the political power and eco-
nomic significance of larger groups.20 2
With smaller industries at risk from foreign imports, yet lacking
the economic and political resources to secure protection, these
manufacturers turned to the antidumping laws. In a series of reput-
edly "non-adversarial" investigations, the domestic industry has
racked up impressive victories over foreign imports. Although the
statute addresses factors to be considered in evaluating injury under
193 Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 9, 9-11, Rule 12.4 (1921).
194 The intent provisions of the 1916 Act erected a burden that was never met. Ac-
cording to one expert, no criminal or civil defendant has ever been successfully prosecuted
under the 1916 Act. See CLUBB, UNrrED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAw (1991).
195 Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 1, § 201(a), 67 Stat. 1, 11 (repealed by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 146-93).
196 Id.
197 Steel Specialty Steel Industry Asks Bush to Extend VRA s, Is Ready to File Trade Cases, 9
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 347 (1992).
198 Japan: U.S. Should Use Trade Remedies to Open Japan's Auto Parts Market, Industry Says, 7
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 289 (1990).
199 Trade Policy: Bush Approves Limited Extension of Machine Tool VRAs withJapan, Taiwan, 9
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 10 (1992).
200 Urea From the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, USITC Pub. No. 1992, Inv. No. 731-TA-338, 731-TA-340 (July 1987).
201 Bulk Ibuprofen From India, USITC Pub. No. 2428, Inv. No. 701-TA-308, 731-TA-526
(Preliminary) (Sept. 1991); Certain Acetylsalicylic Acid (Aspirin)from Turkey, USITC Pub. 200 1,
Inv. No. 701-TA-283; 731-TA-364 (Aug. 1987).
202 "[A]ntidumping . . . duties are, functionally, the poor (or small) man's escape
clause." See H. Finger, et al., The Political Economy of Administered Protection, 72 Am. ECON.
REV. 452 (1982).
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the trade laws, the Act does nothing to guide the International Trade
Commission (ITC) in injury analysis. Over the past years, several
manners of assessing trade injury have developed. Each test reflects
the trade agenda or biases of the decision maker.
C. Methods of Dumping Analysis
One method of determining material injury under the dumping
laws was the five factor test used in the mid-to-late 1980s. This
method of analysis was employed by then Chairperson of the U.S.
International Trade Commission, Susan Liebeler. The five factor
analysis examined causation of material injury in a manner which
harkened back to the Antidumping Laws of 1916 and its views of
predatory dumping. The method first asked if the material injury
suffered by a domestic industry was due to LTFV imports. Chairman
Liebeler then examined the statutory requirement that the Commis-
sion consider the "volume of the imports of the merchandise which
is the subject of the investigation," "the effect of imports of that mer-
chandise on prices in the United States for like products" and "the
impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of like
products." 20 3 Liebeler then concluded that "[a]lthough these fac-
tors fall under the heading 'Material injury,' it seems clear that the
first two are directed at causation. The emphasized words, volume
and effect, refer only to the issue of causation, not to the financial
condition of a domestic industry in either a relative or absolute
sense." 20 4 Liebeler then determined that the statute directs the cau-
sation analysis to two basic factors: volume of imports and the effects
of the LTFV imports on prices.
This reasoning was based on her analysis of the legislative his-
tory of the 1974 trade act. In the legislative history, the Senate Fi-
nance Committee announced that "[t]he Antidumping Act is
designed to discourage and prevent foreign suppliers from using un-
fair price discrimination practices to the detriment of a United States
industry. '20 5 The Chairman concluded that "the focus of the causa-
tion analysis must be on whether the material injury suffered by a
domestic industry is by reason of price discrimination." Liebeler fi-
nally inferred that Congress intended the Antidumping laws to be
applied to instances of predatory pricing.20 6
Upon making this assumption, the Chairman then asserted that
predatory pricing "is only rational if the firm expects to be able to
203 Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, USITC Pub. 1707, Inv. No. 731-TA-196 (June
1985) (additional Views of Chairman Liebeler).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Predatory Price Discrimination occurs when a firm sells below cost in some mar-
kets, and then after its competitors are driven out, it sets a monopoly price. RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 285 (3d ed. 1986).
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raise its prices in the future to a level at which it can more than
recoup the losses it suffers in the present. Thus, predatory pricing
can only be practiced by firms that have or expect to have market
power."207 Recognizing that the Commission would be unable to
delve into the motivations or intentions of a foreign exporter, Chair-
man Liebeler utilized volume and price data as proxies. The five fac-
tor test supports a finding of material injury by reason of less than
fair value imports if the Commission finds: "(1) large and increasing
market share, (2) high dumping margins, (3) homogenous products,
(4) declining prices and (5) barriers to entry to other foreign produ-
cers (low elasticity of supply of other imports)."20 8 Liebeler's under-
standing of the dumping laws and the legislative history was that
Congress intended to prevent price discrimination.20 9
The five factor test was shortlived. The U.S. Court of Interna-
tional Trade in USX Corporation v. U.S.L T.C.2 10 rejected the analysis
as contrary to the statute. Judge Restani observed:
One flaw is that this view necessarily makes the intent of a foreign
producer the focus of the ITC causation inquiry. Another, but not
unrelated flaw, is that this view seems to assume that the purpose of
the antidumping statute is to prevent a particular type of 'injury to
competition' rather than meriely material 'injury to industry.' 2 11
In remanding the investigation to the, ITC, the Court determined
that:
In applying the antidumping law under which this action is brought
it is improper for ITC to place at the center of its causation analysis
the intent of a foreign producer. This inquiry is unavoidable, how-
ever, if one equates unlawful dumping with unfair price discrimina-
tion in the form of predatory pricing. Unlike the 1916 Act, there is
neither a scienter requirement to be found in the statute relevant
here, nor evidence in the relevant legislative history that Congress
intended such a requirement. Thus, contrary to the suggestion in
defendants' brief, what occurred in this case is not the mere incorpo-
ration of another relevant economic factor into a causation analysis
as is clearly permissible under 19 U.S.C. 1677(.7)(B)-(C) (1982). In-
stead, the nature of the reliance on the barrier to entry factor has
worked to change the focus of the injury investigation in a manner
207 Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, supra note 202, at 17.
208 Id. at 19.
209 Id. at 20.
210 USX Corp. v U.S.!. T.C., 682 F. Supp. 60, 65 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
211 Id. at 68. The remand and rejection of the five factor test came at a crucial moment
in ITC and trade history. Although the test had survived for nearly three years, the USX
opinion officially rejecting the analysis occurred when the nomination of ITC Chairman
Liebeler to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was pending before the Sen-
ate. The rejection of this mode of analysis was used by members of the Senate, such as
Senator Lloyd Bentsen and the late Senator John Heinz to block the confirmation of
Chairman Liebeler. The Court to which Liebeler had been nominated was the court which
heard appeals from the Court of International Trade. See 134 CONG. REC. 7527 (1988)
(statement of Senator Heinz); 134 CONG. REC. 3835 (1988) (statement of Senator Heinz);
133 CONG. REc. 17,005 (1987) (statement of Senator Heinz).
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not permitted by Congress.2 12
Another method of analysis is the bifurcated method. Under
this analysis, the ITC examines two questions: first, is the domestic
industry suffering material injury? Second, are there LTFV or
dumped imports?213 If the answer to each is in the affirmative, the
decision maker typically votes in favor of a finding of material injury.
This mode of analysis (often referred to as trend analysis) is flawed
in its simplicity. Although the bifurcated method leads to a large
number of affirmative findings, it fails to link dumping and LTFV
goods with injury to the domestic industry.
The trend analysis also leads to a system of false determinations.
Assume that the domestic industry controls 75% of the market and is
doing well by all objective analyses (sales, prices, wages and employ-
ment are all improving). Now let us assume that the foreign produ-
cers who account for the remaining 25% of the market are dumping
their goods at the dumping margin of 20%. Can we say that the
LTFV imports are causing material injury to the domestic industry?
Under a bifurcated analysis the answer might very well be no. Be-
cause the industry appears to be doing well, it cannot be said to be
incurring material injury under this method of analysis. Thus, the
question of whether the LTFV goods are the cause of this injury is
not even reached.
The flaw of this analysis is obvious. Even though the domestic
industry is doing well, that does not mean that it could not be doing
better. If the LTFV sales were not present, perhaps the market share
of the domestic industry might be 85% or more. Wages, employ-
ment and sales could be higher still. Thus, LTFV sales may be a
cause of material injury to even a healthy industry.
More commonly, the bifurcated approach results in false posi-
tives. For example, assume that the domestic industry is losing mar-
ket share and prices are depressed. Also assume that foreign
manufacturers sell a superior product, use superior technology, take
advantage of larger economies of scale, and even provide lower cost
financing. Further suppose that the foreign manufacturer is selling
his goods at a 10% dumping margin. A bifurcated decision maker
typically would ignore any considerations other that the fact that the
domestic industry is sick and would conclude that dumping exists.
Another method of analysis employed at the ITC is the unitary
analysis. Under this method of analysis, the commissioner assesses
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Digital Readout Systems and Subassemblies Thereof From Japan, USITC Pub.
2150, Inv. No. 731-TA-390, (Jan. 1989) (views of Commissioners Eckes, Rohr, Lodwick
and Newquist); Light Duty Integrated Hydrostatic Transmissions and Subassemblies Thereof With or
Without Attached Axles, from Japan, USITC Pub. 2079, Inv. No. 731-TA-425 (Preliminary)
(Apr. 1988); Fresh Kiwifruit From New Zealand, USITC Pub. 2510, Inv. No. 731-TA-516 (May
1992).
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whether or not the domestic industry is incurring domestic injury by
reason of LTFV imports. Thus, the injury must be linked directly to
the dumping. In analysis such as this, the ITC decision maker typi-
cally employs an economic model form of analysis. This model de-
termines the Comparative Analysis of Domestic Industry Condition
(CADIC).2 14 Under a CADIC analysis, the decision maker must try
to replicate the condition of the domestic industry to simulate a
world free of dumped goods.215 The CADIC approach is the
method of analysis most consistent with the GATT. 216
CADIC analysis leads to consideration of other domestic sellers
and fairly-traded dumped goods in the market when assessing dam-
age. For example, assume the U.S. widget industry filed an an-
tidumping petition. Let us also assume that the U.S. widget
manufacturers control 60% of the domestic market, and that the re-
maining 40% of the market is controlled by foreign imports, some
being fairly traded and others being LTFV goods. Now let's assume
that 10% of the imported goods are LTFV goods from Burkina Faso
and the remaining 30% are fairly traded goods from Japan. If we
pursue a CADIC approach to this injury analysis we would remove
the LTFV goods from the market. The 10% of LTFV sales from
Burkina Faso might now go to the domestic industry. If this was the
case, a decision maker might conclude that the domestic industry is
suffering material injury by reason of the LTFV goods. In other
words, if the LTFV goods were not in the market the sales would
have gone to the domestic industry. Thus, the absence of these sales
might constitute material injury.
Let us now take another approach. Assume the same facts as
above regarding market share and dumping, but now envision a state
where the domestic industry is in horrible decline. The decline may
be attributed to a failure to modernize equipment because of massive
LBO debt burdens or some other corporate mismanagement.2 17 At
the same time, assume that the fairly traded imports are really com-
ing on like gangbusters and are perceived by purchasers as a supe-
214 For an early ITC discussion of CADIC analysis, see 3.5 " Microdisks and Media There-
for From Japan, USITC Pub. 2076, Inv. No. 731-TA-389 (Preliminary) (Apr. 1988) (addi-
tional views of Commissioner Cass).
215 For the definitive discussion of this model, see Certain Telephone Systems and Subas-
semblies Thereoffrom Japan and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2237, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-426, 428 (Nov.
1988) (dissenting views of Vice Chairman Ronald A. Cass).
216 Pursuant to the GATT Antidumping Code:
[I]t must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects
of dumping, causing injury within the meaning of this Code. There may be
other factors which at the same time are injuring the industry, and the inju-
ries caused by other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Art. 3, § 4.
217 See Granite from Italy and Spain, USITC Pub. 2110, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-289, 731-TA-
381, 382 (Aug. 1988).
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rior product. Under a CADIC approach in this particular fact
pattern, there is no assurance that the domestic industry will prevail.
The decision maker may conclude that if the LTFV imports were re-
moved from the market, the sales would not flow to the domestic
industry as a matter of right. However, this is not necessarily the
case. To the contrary, we might see a situation where the fairly
traded imports would receive the benefit of the elimination of the
dumped goods. Accordingly, in such a case there is no reason to
impose dumping duties, because duties would benefit the fairly
traded imports and not the domestic industry.
An even more curious situation occurs when all of the foreign
imports are LTFV goods. It is possible to have a situation where
even if the dumped goods are offset by dumping duties, the dumped
goods are still preferred by the consumer. We must then inquire
whether the domestic industry has in fact been injured by reason of the
LTFVgoods. If not, the antidumping duties serve no purpose other
than to increase transaction costs and actual costs to the consumers.
The duties will not drive the consumer back to purchase domestic
goods. Unless the goods are truly fungible, the antidumping duties
will not transfer the allegedly "lost sales" to the domestic industry.
An excellent example of how the models of dumping analysis
may impact a determination is the recent ITC investigation of
Minivans fromJapan. 218 After struggling in the domestic car market
for several years despite the assistance of Voluntary Restraint Agree-
ments (VRA's) limiting auto imports, the Big Three automakers
brought an antidumping action against Japanese imports of
minivans. Domestic manufacturers of minivans are again trying to
blame all of the industry's woes on unfair trade practices. They as-
sert that they are damaged by the dumping of these vans by Japanese
automakers. The United States International Trade Commission
made an affirmative preliminary determination of material injury
caused by dumped Japanese minivans. 2 19 In the ITC petition, the
Big Three allege that theJapanese engage in unfair trading practices
by charging less money for their minivans in the U.S. than they do in
Japan. Naturally, the Japanese deny this. Regardless of whether
there is dumping or not, the Japanese strategy is not unfair and does
not injure Detroit.
Let us examine this particular investigation under both bifur-
cated and unitary approaches. Assume that the domestic minivan in-
dustry is suffering a decline. Also assume that the Japanese are
selling their minivans for less in the U.S. than in Japan. Following a
bifurcated approach, the domestic industry appears to be in decline
218 Minivans from Japan, USITC Pub. 2401, Inv. No. 731-TA-522 (Preliminary) (July
1991).
219 Id.
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and dumping is also present. Therefore, the injury is presumptively
attributed to the dumping. The flaw of this argument is obvious.
For example, let us suppose that Rolls Royce charges $1,000 less for
its cars in the U.S. than it does it the U.K. Under the methodology
described above, nothing would stop Ford from claiming that slump-
ing sales of its Escort were caused by the dumping of the higher
priced Rolls Royce.
If this sounds ridiculous, we need only look at the minivan inves-
tigations to see this theory actually utilized. Presently, the Big Three
have approximately an 86.1% share of the domestic minivan mar-
ket.2 20 Japanese manufacturers account for 13.2% of this market.2 2 1
Detroit asserts that it has lost 20% of minivanjobs, sales and income
during the first quarter of 1991.222 ITC Commissioner Don E. New-
quist notes that the Japanese market share has more than doubled
during this period. 223 What Commissioner Newquist and others fail
to mention is the fact that the Japanese vehicles are priced higher
than the domestic models, even with the allegations of dumping. Ac-
cording to George Borst, Vice President of Strategic and Products
Planning for Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., "the prices for top-of
the line Previas seem to far exceed almost anything else on the mar-
ket." 2 24 The higher Japanese prices for minivans destroy the con-
spiracy theories of underselling that protectionists in Washington
and Detroit love to bandy about. 225
Now let us attempt a unitary approach. Is the U.S. domestic
minivan industry materially injured by reason of LTFV sales of
Minivans from Japan? Let us agree that the Minivans are being
dumped. Let us also agree for the purposes of our argument that the
domestic industry is incurring material injury. But is the injury
linked to the LTFV sales of the minivans or solely to the existence of
the foreign imports in the U.S. market? The Japanese products are
priced higher than the domestic like product.
If the U.S. minivan industry is suffering injury, yet the higher
220 Stuart Auerbach, U.S. Firms Backed on Minivans; Panel Rules Japanese Imports Hurt Big
3, WASH. POST, July 11, 1991, at B8.
221 Id.222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Diana T. Kurylko, Mazda, Toyota Deny Dumping Charges, AUToMOTIVE NEws,June 24,
1991, at 1.
225 The antidumping statute directs the ITC to consider the degree to which LTFV
imports "undersell" the domestic goods. 19 U.S.C § 1677(7)(C)(ii) (1988). "In almost
every case in which the Commission has made an affirmative determination the imported
product has undersold the domestic product." See William E. Perry, Administration of Import
Trade Laws By the United States International Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 345, 408
(1985). See also Certain Table Wine from the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy, USITC
Pub. 1771, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-258-260 (Preliminary), 731-TA-283-85 (Preliminary) (1985)
(where domestic table wine oversold imported wine, there is no demonstration of causa-
tion by LTFV imports).
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priced and allegedly dumped Japanese goods are not the cause of the
injury, who is to blame? The true sources of the declining domestic
auto industry surprisingly enough are the American consumer and
Detroit. The consumer has not only lost confidence in American
made vehicles, it has institutionalized these preferences. Armed with
dog-eared, borrowed copies of Consumer Reports or Car & Driver, the
well-heeled consumer has established a preference for Japanese
products.
Two of the Japanese vehicles under investigation have benefit-
ted handsomely by positive reviews by U.S. industry analysts. Car &
Driver named the Mazda MPV the best Minivan in the market in a
1989 survey. 226 Individual articles praised the reliability, handling
and design of the Mazda minivan. On the heels of Mazda's suc-
cesses, Toyota released the Previa minivan in 1990. It too was met
with cheers from car experts. According to a recent Car & Driver
report, "the Previa is as good as minivans get."' 22 7 Similar kudos
have been earned by other Japanese minivans under investigation in
Consumer Reports magazine.2 28 Perhaps the highest compliment paid
to the Japanese minivans came from the U.S. car makers themselves.
Car & Driver reported in October, 1991 that both the 1991 Dodge
Caravan and the Plymouth Voyager minivans have " . . . a vaguely
MPVish look about them."22 9 This is no mere coincidence since
Chrysler engineers apparently spent eighteen months analyzing, dis-
mantling and driving the Mazda MPV in efforts to improve the
Chrysler product. 230
The antidumping investigation is a trade barrier employed by
the Big Three automakers to chill other potentially successful Japa-
nese entrants into the market. Mitsubishi plans to introduce the
Expo minivan this summer and Honda plans to unveil its minivan in
1993 or 1994.231 This investigation is simply designed to chill Japa-
nese automakers from further penetration of the U.S. market and
broaden application of the VRAs. Detroit is engaged in a shameless
abuse of the dumping laws.2 32
D. Domestic Abuses of the Dumping Laws
Apart from the methodology followed by various decision mak-
226 William Jeanes, et al., Best Buys 1990, CAR & DRIVER, May 1990, at 37.
227 John Phillips, III, et al., Toyota Previa LE, CAR & DRIVER, Sept. 1990, at 73.
228 New Car Ratings, CONSUMER REPORTS, Apr. 1992, at 73.
229 John Phillips, Dodge Caravan Plymouth Voyager, CAR & DRIVER, Oct. 1990, at 99.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 It is also asserted that the Minivan Investigation was designed as a fishing expedi-
tion for the Department of Commerce to investigate the Japanese keiretsu system. See
Gates, Mazda, Toyota Protest Dumping Edict, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, May 25, 1992. To the indus-
try's surprise, the ITC reached a negative determination. Minivan 's From Japan, USITC
Pub. 2529, Inv. No. 731-7A-522 (July 1992).
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ers, the dumping laws themselves virtually assure domestic industry
victories and contradict stated U.S. trade policies. The U.S. has
pushed for transparency in international trade and for a level playing
field. Yet, the U.S. dumping laws are anything but level. For exam-
ple, in determining whether a domestic industry is suffering material
injury, the ITC is mandated to consider pricing information. The
ITC must compare the exporters' home price with the sales in the
United States. In many cases, the exporter will only be producing
the good for export and will have no sales in its home market.253
In these instances, the Department of Commerce may either
compare the U.S. sales price with a price charged by a comparable
firm or simply construct the value of the goods. Under the statute,
constructed value includes "[t]he cost of materials . . . and of
fabrication or other processing of any kind employed in producing
such or similar merchandise, at a time preceding the date of exporta-
tion of the merchandise under consideration which would permit the
production of that particular merchandise in the ordinary course of
business." 23 4 Constructed value also includes at least a 10% share
of cost as general expenses and an "amount for profit not less than 8
percent of the sum of such general expenses and costs."12 3 5 This sec-
tion of the statute and its applications are criticized by our trading
partners and importers.2 36 The draft final agreement of the Uruguay
Round of the GATT would amend the use of constructed value and
repeal the arbitrary 8% profit calculation in constructed value.23 7
Imports from non-market economies are presented with similar
problems under the antidumping laws. If the Department of Com-
merce is unable to construct the value due to inadequate informa-
tion, foreign market value is determined "on the basis of the price at
which merchandise that is (A) comparable to the merchandise under
investigation, and (B) produced in one or more market economy
countries that are at a level of development comparable to that of the
non-market country." 238 The government has no guidance as to
what is an appropriate country for comparison. For example, one
legendary antidumping case involved electric golf cars from Po-
land.2 3 9 Poland was a non-market economy, with no golf courses
and no reliable domestic price. The Department of Treasury deter-
233 Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 25497 (U.S. Dept. of Treasury 1975).
234 19 U.S.C § 1677b(e)(1)(A) (1988).
235 Id.
236 See Register of United States Barriers to Trade 1992, External Affairs and International
Trade Canada; Report on United States Trade Barriers and Unfair Practices, Commission of the
European Communities (1991); Report on Unfair Trade Policies and Practices, Japanese Fair
Trade Center (1991).
237 Few Changes Seen Required in U.S. Antidumping Law Under GATT Plan, INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) (Feb. 12, 1992).
238 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (c)(2) (1988).
239 Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 25497 (U.S. Dept. of Treasury 1975).
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mined that for the purposes of constructing value, Canada was a
country comparable to Poland.240 In other similarly speculative in-
vestigations, China has been compared to Argentina 24 I and Thai-
land.24 2 Portugal was used as a surrogate for Hungary. 243
While the antidumping laws favor the domestic industry, they
also punish developing states that the U.S. wishes to assist. For ex-
ample, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-
free entry into the U.S of certain imports from less developed na-
tions. 244 The GSP gives preferential duty-free entry to approxi-
mately 4,284 products from 134 beneficiary countries. 245  As
developing states mature industrially, they may "graduate" from the
GSP program. 246 Notable commercial successes of the GSP include
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. 247 "Alumni" of
the GSP program require far less U.S. foreign aid. Furthermore,
their newly robust economies become new markets for U.S. goods
and services.
Similarly, under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 248 twenty-
three Caribbean Basin countries receive duty-free treatment for a va-
riety of exports. Pursuant to the CBI, the U.S. provides economic
assistance to facilitate private investment as well as tax incentives to
U.S. firms hosting conventions in member states. 249 Like the GSP,
the CBI has twin goals of promoting political stability and economic
development. By supporting development in strategically located
neighboring states, U.S. foreign policy goals are achieved. Addition-
ally, because the U.S. is the major exporter of goods to this region,
further economic progress in CBI states will increase opportunities
for U.S. exports.
Despite the fact that the U.S. ostensibly welcomes and encour-
ages exports from these states, the antidumping laws and abuses of
these laws thwart imports of these products. When imports or goods
from a GSP state become competitive, domestic manufacturers insti-
240 Id.
241 Certain Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes From the People's Republic of China,
USITC Pub. 1885, Inv. No. 731-TA-292 (1987).
242 Porcelain on Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, The People's China and Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 1911, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-265, 731-TA-297-299 (1986).
243 Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, and Certain Housings Incorporating
Tapered Rollers From Hungary, The People's Republic of China and Romania, USITC
Pub. 1983, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-341, 344-345 (1987).
244 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1988).
245 Id. See also OFFICE OF THE USTR, A GUIDE TO THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES (August 1991).
246 "Graduation is the discretionary removal of GSP eligibility." Id. Products or coun-
tries may graduate from the GSP program. Id.
247 BRIAN KELLY & MARK LONDON, THE FOUR LITrLE DRAGONS (1989).
248 See The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983; Caribbean Basin Eco-
nomic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C. § 2701. et. seq. (1990).
249 The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983; Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq. (1990).
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tute antidumping actions. For example, steel,250 industrial belts,25'
baseball caps,252 and wiping rags253 from CBI or GSP countries have
all been on the receiving end of protectionist trade actions. If the
U.S. decides that these goods are to be welcomed, let us welcome
them wholeheartedly. Ideally, GSP and CBI goods should be totally
exempt from the antidumping laws. However, such a proposal will
never succeed. Therefore, I offer the following compromise: GSP
and CBI goods should be exempt from the antidumping laws until
the imports from a particular state represent 10% of the U.S. market
share and a dumping margin of 50% or more is found. By establish-
ing a statutory minimum market share and dumping margin, this
proposal adopts a presumptive CADIC analysis to the issue. Imports
of GSP and CBI states will be able to enter the U.S. free of harass-
ment from ITC petitioners.
Under the antidumping law the Commission may "cumulatively
assess the volume and effect of imports from two or more countries
of like products" to determine material injury.2 54 Currently, CBI
imports may only be cumulated with imports from other CBI na-
tions. 255 GSP should be included in this form of cumulation. Addi-
tionally, GSP. or CBI states should be exempt from the cumulation
provisions of the statute unless each state represents at least 5% of
the U.S. market.
The institution of a frivolous antidumping petition already
serves as an effective non-tariff barrier. The entire process of litigat-
ing an antidumping petition is not only biased and complicated, but
in many cases, is nearly prohibitively expensive. For example, lesser-
developed countries such as Bangladesh,2 56 Kenya, 257 El Salva-
dor,258 Costa Rica, 259 Ecuador,2 60 and Pakistan 261 have been hit with
antidumping petitions. For most respondents in these states, the
250 See Steel Wire Rope From the Republic of Korea and Mexico, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-546, 547
(Preliminary) (1992); Certain Carbon Steel Butt- Weld Pipe Fittings From China and Thailand, Inv.
Nos, 731-TA-520, 521 (Preliminary) (1992).
251 See Industrial Belts From Israel, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, The United
Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2113, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-293-295, 731-TA-412-
419 (1989).
252 See Sewn Cloth Headwear From The People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 2183, Inv.
No. 731-TA-405 (1989).
253 See Shop Towels From Bangladesh, USITC Pub. 2487, Inv. No. 731-TA-514 (1992).
254 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (7)(C)(iv) (1988).
255 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (7)(C)(iv)(II) (1988).
256 Shop Towels From Bangladesh, USITC Pub. 2487, Inv. No. 731-TA-514 (1992).
257 Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Kenya and Mexico, USITC Pub. 1968, Inv. Nos. 731-
TA-332, 333 (1987).
258 Operators for Jalousie and Awning Windows from El Salvador, USITC Pub. 1934, Inv. No.
73 1-TA-319 (1987).
259 Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador, USITC
Pub. 1956, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-327-331 (1987).
260 Id.
261 Shop Towels From Pakistan, USITC Pub. 1490, Inv. No. 701-TA-202 (1984).
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very concept of an antidumping action is news. These exporters are
simply not prepared technically or financially to compete in the ITC
arena. Respondents are unable to pull together the elaborate pric-
ing, sales, and cost accounting data required by the ITC and the De-
partment of Commerce. Not only is the data collection process
nearly impossible for the respondents, the submission process itself
becomes an insurmountable trade barrier. For example, in the Ban-
gladesh shop towel investigation, the respondents were initially re-
quested to supply their evidence on magnetic computer tapes. 262
The absurdity of this request is obvious. If the Bangladeshis had
computerS, why in the world would they be producing shop towels, a
product on the bottom rung of the textile ladder?
Additionally, the cost of the antidumping investigation weakens
or eliminates the prospect of a vigorous defense. LDC and GSP
states may simply lack the financial resources needed to litigate an
antidumping action. Legal fees in such cases routinely run in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars, not to mention the thousands of
dollars needed to retain economists or other experts. Many coun-
tries are simply ill prepared to respond to the allegations of dump-
ing, let alone attempt to litigate them.
To truly understand the impact of the abuse of trade laws on
lesser-developed countries we will examine a recent investigation. 263
Bangladesh, with an annual per capita income of $180 is one of the
world's poorest countries.264 The people of Bangladesh are annu-
ally visited by floods, cyclones and typhoons of truly epic propor-
tions; for example, a 1991 storm claimed over 125,000 lives.
Enduring regular natural disasters and clinging to economic survival
by a thread, Bangladesh bravely fights on. Indeed, despite its finan-
cial woes, Bangladesh contributed to Operation Desert Storm by
sending a small detachment of troops to join the allied coalition.2 65
With the Gulf War ended and Bangladesh struggling to survive
its most recent natural disaster, American industry decided to "re-
pay" the people of Bangladesh for their support. Did we forgive
their debts? Establish new businesses in Bangladesh? No. Instead,
corporate America and the protectionists chose to repay Bangladesh
by attacking their fledgling economy with allegations of unfair trade
practices and instituting an antidumping investigation, effectively
closing our markets to certain Bangladesh exports.
At this point, even the most protectionist corporate, political, or
262 Shop Towels From Bangladesh, USITC Pub. 2487, Inv. No. 731-TA-514 (1992).
263 The author assisted in the representation of the Bangladeshi importers described
in this investigation on a pro bono basis.
264 Disbursements of aid to Bangladesh from the U.S. in 1986 was $104 million, with
total disbursements from the major aid donors of $1,303 million. BANGLADESH, A COUN-
TRY STUDY, Area Handbook Series (2d Ed. 1989).
265 McCrory, The "Ahem" Bangladesh Challenge, WASH. POST, 1991.
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economic observer must pause and wonder what export from Ban-
gladesh could threaten to materially injure a U.S. industry. Surely
the U.S semiconductor, steel, and automobile industries can with-
stand competition from Bangladesh. Yet, the Bangladeshi were sell-
ing cheap rags in the United States-the vital area of our economy
that is under siege from-these "unfair practices" is the crucial "shop
towel industry."
The U.S. textile industry asserts that Bangladesh manufacturers
of "industrial wiping cloths", more commonly referred to as "shop
towels", dump these products in the U.S. markets. This petition to
the U.S. International Trade Commission was filed by Milliken & Co.
(Milliken), a firm dominated by an avowed protectionist.266 The to-
tal value of shop towels imports from Bangladesh was only $2.46
million. Milliken, on the other hand, has estimated annual sales of
$2.5 billion.2 67 Imports from Bangladesh have not had an adverse
impact on inventories in the domestic industry. The domestic indus-
try, led by petitioner, has adopted a system of tight inventory con-
trols and maintains a low ratio of inventories to monthly shipments.
Petitioner also has computerized inventory controls.
The Bangladeshis were just the next target of the Milliken cam-
paign against lesser-developed countries producing shop towels. On
August 24, 1982, Milliken & Co., the petitioner in the current investi-
gation, filed an antidumping petition with the ITC and the Depart-
ment of Commerce on cotton shop towels from the People's
Republic of China.2 68 In September 1983, the Commission deter-
mined that an industry in the United States was materially injured by
such imports from China.269 OnJuly 29, 1983, Milliken filed a coun-
tervailing duty petition with the ITC and Department of Commerce
on cotton shop towels from Pakistan. 270 The Commission deter-
mined that an industry in the United States was materially injured by
such imports from Pakistan in 1984.271 On March 28, 1984, Milliken
filed a countervailing duty petition with the Department of Com-
merce on cotton shop towels from yet another "industrial giant,"
Peru. 2 72 The Department of Commerce decided to suspend the in-
vestigation, effective September 12, 1984, based on an agreement to
266 Mr. Milliken's announcement that "I want to do everything in my power to do away
with the Uruguay Round" is an example of his protectionist ardor. See Greg Rushford,
Threading Political Needles; How Textile Magnate Roger Milliken Wins Quotas and Influences People,
LEGAL TiMEs, Nov. 19, 1990, at 1.
267 Milliken is the world's largest privately-held textile company and the largest textile
company in the United States. Annual sales by Milliken are approximately $2.5 billion.
Report on Milliken & Co., Inc., HoovERs HANDBOOK (1991).
268 Shop Towels From China, USITC Pub. 1431, Inv. No. 731-TA-103 (1983).
269 Id.
270 Shop Towels From Pakistan, USITC Pub. 1490, Inv. No. 701-TA-202 (1984).
271 Id.
272 Shop Towels From Bangladesh, USITC Pub. 2487, Inv. No. 731-TA-514 (1992).
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cease exports of the product to the United States.2 73 Since the sus-
pension, the government has made two unsuccessful attempts to ter-
minate the investigation. Ever vigilant, Milliken objected to the
Department of Commerce's intent to terminate the suspended
investigation.2 74
Each time a new shop towel exporter has appeared on the scene
in the last ten years, Milliken has petitioned the U.S. government for
relief. China, Pakistan, and Peru have all been victimized by Milli-
ken's rapacious desire to monopolize an industry. Milliken enjoys a
healthy market share of over 60% in the shop towel industry. Unsat-
isfied by this success, Milliken has been abusing the trade laws to
squeeze out any foreign exporter that it perceives as a rival. Milli-
ken's own officers acknowledge the firm's anticompetitive trade
agenda. Terry Topp, product manager for shop towels at Milliken
boasts "I know everybody at [the U.S. Trade Representative] and at
Commerce. When they see me coming down the hall, it's 'Here
comes Terry, the shop-towel man. Who do you want us to go after
now?' ",275
Milliken's petitions in this investigation are illustrative of the
depths to which he will sink to control a market. Initially, on Decem-
ber 13, 1990, Milliken filed a petition with the Department of Com-
merce alleging that the Bangladeshi government was subsidizing
shop towel exports to the United States. The absurdity of the allega-
tion that one of the world's poorest nations was subsidizing anything
was recognized by the Department of Commerce and the counter-
vailing duty action was dismissed.2 76 Milliken also recognized the
futility of this action, yet instituted the investigation regardless of
merit. John Greenwald, an attorney at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
and counsel for Milliken admits that "[w]e brought a countervailing
duty case [against Bangladesh] in part because it was cheaper than an
antidumping proceeding in that it did not require a finding of injury
and in part because we frankly did not have hard evidence on Ban-
gladeshi pricing practices. '277 The dismissed CVD action was
merely a fishing expedition by Milliken to harass and intimidate Ban-
gladesh, as Peru, Pakistan, and China had been similarly harassed in
the past. In fact, had Milliken instituted a similarly meritless action
in Federal Court they would have found themselves on the receiving
273 Id.
274 See Shop Towels From Bangladesh, USITC Pub. 2379, Inv. No. 731-TA-514 (Prelimi-
nary) (May 1991), at 19.
275 See Terrence Moran, Riches From Rags, LEGAL TIMES, May 27, 1991, at 5.
276 See Commerce Says Only De Minimus Subsidy Found on Shop Towels From Bangladesh,
IN1T'L TRADE DAILY (BNA),July 5, 1991. See also William Lash, III, U.S. Textile Makers Fear
Bangladesh's Rags, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1991, at A12.
277 Transcript of Proceedings of the U.S. International Trade Commission, Inv. No.
731-TA-514 (Preliminary), Testimony ofJohn Greenwald, Apr. 19, 1991, at 8.
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end of Rule 11278 sanctions for filing a frivolous and baseless suit.
Milliken's instant antidumping petition is equally baseless. Milli-
ken alleged that the Bangladeshi shop-towel makers are deliberately
selling their products at a loss to seize U.S. market share. The
charges are based on information provided to the Department of
Commerce during the countervailing-duty investigation: balance
sheets from 1990 show all five Bangladeshi exporters operating at a
loss. In essence, Milliken is suggesting that the Bangladeshi export-
ers are engaged in predatory pricing behavior. In its brief, Milliken
alleges a predatory intent by the Bangladeshi exporters. This is
clearly contrary to the economics, law, and reality that the Court of
International Trade recognized in USX Corporation v. United States,279
stating that "[in applying the antidumping law ... it is improper for
the Commission to place at the center of its causation analysis the
intent of a foreign producer.12 80 This inquiry is unavoidable, how-
ever, because Milliken equates unlawful dumping with unfair price
discrimination in the form of predatory pricing.
This allegation is not supported by either facts or economic
analysis and ignores the antidumping laws. First, Bangladesh cannot
hope to expand or capture market share by engaging in predatory
practices. A quota on Bangladeshi shop towels was recently negoti-
ated following a quota call imposed by the Department of Commerce
on October 31, 1990. The Memorandum of Understanding between
the United States and Bangladesh, dated April 5, 1991, imposed a
limit on shop towels imports of 1,010,640 kilograms for quota year
1991, 1,071,278 kilograms for quota year 1992, and 1,135,555 kilo-
grams for quota year 1993.281 The recently adopted quota on Ban-
gladeshi imports removes any incentive for dumping or predation by
Bangladeshi exporters. Because imports of Bangladeshi shop towels
are limited under the quota, even the chimerical predatory practices
alleged would not assist Bangladesh in seizing additional market
share because Bangladesh simply will not be permitted to increase
sales in the U.S. market in contravention of the quota. Furthermore,
The United States Supreme Court observed in Matsshita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 282 that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely
tried, and even more rarely successful. ' 283 If a predatory pricing
scheme by an industrial giant such as Matsushita was unlikely, such a
scheme by Bangladeshi manufacturers and their hand looms is
ridiculous.
278 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
279 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 205, 682 F. Supp. 60 (1988).
280 682 F. Supp. at 68.
281 Shop Towels from Bangladesh, USITC Pub. 2379, Inv. No. 731-TA-514 (Preliminary)
(May 1991), at 36-37.
282 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
283 Id
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Milliken argued that "[tihe losses incurred by each [Ban-
gladeshi] producer on its shop towel exports necessarily mean that
those exports are at less than fair value prices. ' 284 What petitioner
conveniently ignored is the fact that these businesses are all in the
start up stages. Upon entry into an industry, losses are common. To
subscribe to the ludicrous argument advanced by petitioner would
convert the bulk of new exporters in every industry into a cadre of
predatory dumpers. Such a conclusion is neither supported nor
warranted.
In support of its petition, Milliken also asserts that by using con-
structed value they can demonstrate that the Bangladeshi sales are
being made at less than fair value. Milliken improperly maintains
that "[s]ince every producer exports all its production to the United
States, the only statutory basis available to establish the fair value of
the exported towels is constructed value." 2 85 In making its con-
structed value calculation, Milliken adds what it purports to be the
cost of production of shop towels by each Bangladeshi producer: the
selling costs, general and administrative expenses, and a profit of
eight percent.286 The constructed value asserted by Milliken is in-
herently contradictory. The attribution of a profit of 8% to the Ban-
gladeshi exporters is obviously illogical in light of Milliken's own
recognition that the Bangladeshi exporters are all operating at a loss.
As evidenced in Milliken's petition and in respondent's brief,
Milliken has succeeded, for the past decade, in driving foreign com-
petitors out of this market by abusing the trade laws. Although peti-
tioner's strategy is reprehensible, it also illustrates the absence of
any damage to Milliken from imported shop towels. In 1982, China
was driven from the market by Milliken, yet Milliken did not pick up
the former Chinese customers. These buyers of low quality shop
towels preferred to buy from Peru. Eventually Peru emerged as an
exporter and Milliken forced them from the market. Peru's place in
the market was taken by Pakistan, not by the domestic industry. Fi-
nally, Pakistan was squeezed from the market by Milliken's an-
tidumping actions in 1984. Again the sales of shop towels formerly
made by Pakistan went to Bangladesh, another less developed coun-
try.28 7 The evidence furnished by Milliken's history of harassment in
this industry suggests that Bangladesh is competing not with the do-
mestic industry but with other less developed countries. If the im-
ports from Bangladesh were eliminated by antidumping duties,
another less developed country would fill the gap created by the loss
284 Shop Towels from Bangladesh Milliken Antidumping Petition, Mar. 29, 1991, at 8.
285 Id. at 7.
286 Id. at 6-13.
287 See Statement of Azher Khan, President, Calderon Textiles, Shop Towelsfrom Bangla-
desh, USITC Pub. 2379, Inv. No. 731-TA-514 (Preliminary) (May 1991).
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of the Bangladeshi exports. 288 Thus, any curtailment or elimination
of Bangladeshi imports would not benefit the domestic industry.
Bangladeshi shop towels pose no threat of material injury to the
domestic manufacturers; they have dropped substantially in the past
year. There are several reasons for the decline in shipments. First,
the quota imposed on Bangladeshi imports will hold them to 6%
growth per year, starting from a figure well below that of even the
troubled 1990 year. A second reason for the decline in shipments is
the typhoon that visited Bangladesh in the spring of 1991, killing
over 150,000 people and demolishing much of the Bangladeshi shop
towel facilities. According to Naiz Rahim, owner of Greyfab Ltd.,
"[t]he factory was under chest-deep water, and only the structure it-
self and the standing machines were not washed away. We are now
disassembling the machines, cleaning them of the mud, and reassem-
bling them by hand."2 89
The domestic industry in March 1992 won an affirmative deci-
sion at the ITC by a vote of 3-2.290
E. Domestic Ills Resulting from the Dumping Laws
Third World states are not the only ones injured by abuse of the
antidumping laws. United States firms and workers utilizing im-
ported goods are hit hardest and most regularly. Unlike the antitrust
laws which protect injuries to competition, the dumping laws are
abused to protect domestic competitors. The argument that workers
are protected or even considered under the act is indeed a hollow
one. For example, in 1991, the International Trade Commission ad-
dressed a case of dumping involving foreign producers of active ma-
trix liquid crystal computer screens. 291 The foreign manufacturers
sold their screens to several firms in the U.S., notably IBM, Apple,
and Compaq computers. 292 Toshiba also manufactured computers
in the U.S. utilizing imported screens. The Advanced Display Manu-
facturers of America, a coalition of six start-up U.S. screen manufac-
turers instituted the antidumping action.293 The ITC determined
that the U.S. screen industry was suffering material injury from the
LTFV sales of imported laptop screens. An antidumping duty of
288 As a result of the antidumping duties, the importers of Bangladeshi shop towels
are shifting supply from Bangladesh to Nepal. Interview with Azher Khan, President of
Calderon Textiles (Jan. 24, 1992).
289 Moran, supra note 274.
290 Shop Towels From Bangladesh, USITC Pub. 2487, Inv. No. 731-TA-514 (1992). See
also William Lash, III, Goliath Slays David at the ITC, J. OF INT'L COM., Mar. 17, 1992.
291 High-Information Content Flat Panel Displays and Display Glass Thereof from Japan,
USITC Pub. 2413, Inv. No. 731-TA-469 (Aug. 1991).
292 See Imported Japanese Flat Panel Displays Injure U.S. Industry, ITC Says, INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA), Aug. 21, 1991.
293 U.S. Manufacturers Threatened by Duties on Japanese Computer Displays, INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA),June 12, 1991.
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62.67% was imposed on the imported screens in question. 294
Unfortunately, the antidumping duty threatened to raise the
price of U.S.-made computers by an estimated $500 per machine. 295
Under the import laws of the U.S., in light of the antidumping duties,
it is cheaper for manufacturers to import the entire computer instead
of paying the prohibitively high punitive tariff. Toshiba switched
production from Irvine, California to Japan to avoid the antidumping
duties. 296 Similarly, Apple and Compaq began discussions to assem-
ble color SLT laptops in Singapore, abandoning earlier plans to
manufacture domestically. 297 One of the sharpest critics of the ITC
determination was industry leader IBM. IBM characterized the new
tariffs as "an eviction notice from the U.S. Government to the fast-
est-growing part of the U.S. computer industry." 298 IBM transferred
laptop computer development to IBM Japan to avoid the steep an-
tidumping duties. IBM Chairman John Akers acknowledged that this
relocation of production to Japan would mean ". . . an export of
American jobs" and a worsening of the trade imbalance.299
This case illustrates a major flaw in the trade laws. The true loss
or damage to the nation comes from the relocation of jobs, and not
from the dumping by the Japanese manufacturers. If the duties were
not imposed, the screen manufacturers claim that they would not be
able to compete with the lower priced Japanese goods. The screen
industry might go out of existence and dozens of jobs would be lost.
But here, when the duties are imposed, hundreds of jobs will be
transferred overseas as the laptop manufacturers move abroad.
The trade laws should be amended to address situations such as
this. Currently, under the antidumping laws, impact of LTFV sales
on employment must be considered. I propose to expand the scope
of this analysis. The impact of LTFV sales and antidumping duties on
employment should be considered. Thus, in a case like the laptop screens,
the impact of duties on the importer's work force would be analyzed.
In the event that more jobs are saved by failure to impose antidump-
ing duties, this factor could legitimately be considered by the ITC.
Another factor needing consideration under the antidumping
laws is U.S. foreign policy goals. The U.S. pushes states such as Ven-
ezuela to be less dependent on oil revenues. Colombia is urged to
abandon the lucrative illegal cocaine trade and develop more posi-
294 Japanese Flat Panel Manufacturer Halts Exports To U.S., Routes to Asia, INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), Aug. 28, 1991.
295 Neal Boudette, Dumping the Color LCD Tariff Will Save Jobs; Liquid Crystal Display Edi-
torial, P.C. WEEK, Feb. 10, 1992, at 76.
296 See David E. Sanger, U.S. TariffAppears to Backfire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at D1.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 See David E. Sanger, Company News; I.B.M. Chief Issues Threat on U.S. Tariff, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at D4.
[VOL. 18
U.S. TRADE POLICY
tive exports. The results of these efforts have been less than spectac-
ular. The Venezuelan exporters who diversify and export
aluminum30 0 and cement3 0 1 have been met with antidumping peti-
tions. As illustrated earlier, these petitions will prevent or chill ex-
ports from these newly industrialized states. In the case of
Venezuelan cement, the import was not "under selling" the regional
producers in Florida. However, the Venezuelan producers simply
met competition, selling their product in the U.S. at the same price
as the local manufacturers. 30 2 This price discrimination made them
vulnerable to an antidumping allegation. The greater foreign policy
aim of supporting a U.S. encouraged transition from oil dependency
to a diversified economy plays no part in the antidumping decision.
Similarly, the Colombian and Peruvian exporters of roses and
fresh-cut flowers have been on the receiving end of a series of an-
tidumping investigations.3 0 3 As the U.S. attempts vainly to combat
the international cocaine cartels, domestic flower producers threaten
Colombian and Peruvian exports. Again, the more significant for-
eign policy goal of weaning the Colombian and Peruvian economies
from cocaine exportation is ignored in the antidumping scheme.30 4
The antidumping law should be further amended to allow the
International Trade Commission to consider foreign policy or other
national agendas in analyzing dumping cases. The domestic flower
industry may indeed be incurring material injury due to LTFV sales
of Colombian roses. However, the higher goal of encouraging non-
illicit Colombian exports surely is worthy of consideration by the
ITC. The foreign policy goal may not necessarily outweigh the in-
terests of the U.S. in protecting the domestic industry in all cases.
However, the ITC should be given the flexibility and discretion to
consider U.S. foreign policy as well as the impact on consumers and
employment. Foreign policy goals and initiatives of the United
States should be added as a factor to be considered in determining
material injury. The Department of State should be required to ana-
lyze the impact of an antidumping action on U.S. foreign policy.
300 Certain Electrical Conductor Aluminum Redraw Rod From Venezuela, USITC Pub. 2103,
Inv. No. 701-TA-287 (Aug. 1988).
301 Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Venezuela, Inv. No. 303-TA-21 (Mar. 18,
1992).
302 See Clarkson & Morrell, The Adverse Consequences on Competition and the Florida Economy
from Restricting Cement Imports, Sept. 1991 (on file at the ITC and with the author). See also
Passell, Cement Shoes for Venezuela, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1991.
303 See Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador,
USITC Pub. 1956, Inv. No. 731-TA-327-331 (Mar. 1987); Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From
Peru, USITC Pub. 1968, Inv. No. 731-TA-334 (Apr. 1987).
304 Dumping investigations are not the only dilemma for Colombian flower producers.
The Fresh Cut Flower Import Regulation Act, H.R. 3484, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991),
introduced by Rep. Leon Panetta, (D-Cal.) would limit imports or impose a quota on im-
ported cut flowers, require the Commerce Department to monitor the price of imported
flowers and take action to impose higher penalties for illegally traded flowers.
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Consideration of these factors is analogous to the treatment of
the public interest under the antidumping laws. Currently, the ITC
may consider the "public interest" in deciding whether to terminate
or suspend an antidumping investigation. 30 5 The ITC is statutorily
mandated to "take into account ... whether, based upon the relative
impact on consumer prices and the availability of supplies of the
merchandise, the agreement would have a greater adverse impact on
United States consumers than the imposition of dumping duties."30 6
Additionally, the ITC may evaluate "the relative impact [of the
agreement] on the international economic interests of the United
States."3
07
V. The Lack of Coordination In Trade Policy
Another flaw in the U.S. trade policy is the lack of flexibility and
consistency. The U.S. has been sending mixed signals to its trading
partners for several years. An excellent example of this is the U.S.-
China trade relationship. The administration has pushed for most-
favored-nation status for China. Simultaneously, China has been as-
sailed by U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills as a leading pirate of
copyrighted, patented, and trademarked materials, and as being re-
sponsible for nearly half a billion dollars in losses to American indus-
tries. China was recently listed as a priority foreign country in the
National Trade Estimate Report on Trade Barriers. 30 8 Thus, within
the course of one year, the Administration has fought to offer China
the reward of MFN status while threatening them with massive trade
sanctions for patent infringement.
Additionally, the decision to grant support of the MFN privilege
for China despite Beijing's repressive regime runs counter to the
current linkage of tariff and trade concessions to human rights. The
United States has successfully used trade policy to achieve foreign
policy and human rights objectives. For example, trade with the for-
mer Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc states has been linked to
free emigration policies for many years. The 1974 Jackson-Vanik
Amendment30 9 prohibits most-favored-nation status for countries
that do not allow their citizens to emigrate freely. Pressure from the
United States and the threat of prohibitive tariffs (high enough to
double the cost of exports to the United States) was a vital force in
305 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 c(a)(2)(B) (1988).
306 19 U.S.C. § 1673 c(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988).
307 19 U.S.C. § 1673 c(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988). The ITC is also instructed to consider "the
relative impact on the competitiveness of the domestic industry producing the like mer-
chandise, including any such impact on employment and investment in that industry." 19
U.S.C. § 1673 c(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988).
308 U.S.-China Intellectual Property Accord Ends Threat of U.S. Retaliatory Duties, 9 Iiqrr'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 139 (1992).
309 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1988).
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opening these countries' borders. 310 Supporters of Jackson-Vanik
claim partial responsibility for the more than ten-fold increase from
16,000 in 1988 to 200,000 in 1990 ofJewish emigres from the Soviet
Union.3 1' The United States also has linked trade benefits to other
human rights and labor issues. Many developing countries export
into the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences.
Nations that violate workers' rights such as the Sudan, Romania, and
Chile have been denied GSP privileges. Benin, Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Israel, Malaysia, and
Bangladesh all have been investigated for workers rights abuses at
the risk of losing GSP benefits. 312
Perhaps the non-trade issue most successfully linked to interna-
tional trade is apartheid. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986313 prohibits most U.S. investment, loans, technology transfer,
or other trade with South Africa. Furthermore, foreign companies
replacing abandoned U.S. commerce with South Africa face U.S.
trade sanctions. In enacting this landmark legislation Congress an-
nounced that" . . . the United States no longer accepts further de-
lays in human, economic and political rights for all citizens of South
Africa." 314
In his recent address, President Bush claims that trade ... is a
means to bring the influence of the outside world to bear on
China."' 315 The President dismissed the arguments that "hurting
China's economy will somehow help the cause of privatization and
human rights." 3 6 This is the identical argument that the Adminis-
tration used in 1986 in its opposition to the anti-apartheid legisla-
tion. It is no more persuasive in 1992.
The United States has threatened to withhold trade privileges
from allies such as Bangladesh and Israel while ignoring Chinese re-
pression. The Bush Administration's support of MFN status for
China confuses our trading partners and is internally inconsistent
with standard policies.317 Unfortunately, the trade situation with
China is only one of the mixed signals that we have been sending our
310 See Michael Beasley, Note, An Interim Analysis of the Effects of thejackson-Vanik Amend-
ment on Trade on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian Example, 8 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
193, 195-219 (1976).
311 International Relationships, Political Risk Services, May 1, 1991.
312 Czechoslovakia Eligible for GSP Immediately, Sudan Benefits Cut for Worker Rights Abuses, 8
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 649 (1991); see also William Lash, III, Unwelcome Imports: Racism,
Sexism and Foreign Investment, 13 MIcH. J. INT'L LAw 1, 41 (1991); William Lash, III, Don't
Reward China's Leaders, J. OF CoM., June 4, 1991, at 8A.
31S 22 U.S.C. § 5001, et seq. (1988).
314 H.R. 4868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., House Report on H.R. 4868, Comprehensive
Antiapartheid Act of 1986.
315 Remarks at the Yale Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut, 27 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 674 (May 27, 1991).
316 Id.
317 Don't Reward China's Leaders, supra note 312.
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trading partners. The lack of flexibility and recognition of commer-
cial, economic, and political reality also frustrates U.S. exporters and
trading partners. A prime example of this flaw is the Administration
view regarding countertrade. 318
Many American companies, including Monsanto, McDonnell
Douglas, Boeing, General Electric, and United Technologies, use
countertrade as a matter of course. About 6% of all U.S. exports
involve some form of countertrade.31 9 Countertrade has trans-
formed from being a necessary evil in international trade to an in-
creasingly valuable tool in competing globally. According to Acting
Assistant Commerce Secretary for Trade Development James Lake,
over 100 countries require countertrade in some part of their gov-
ernment procurement. The U.N. estimates that countertrade ac-
counts for ten to twenty percent of all world trade.3 20
Countertrade allows the buying country to save currency for
other purchases and stimulates technology transfer,3 2' but is far
from perfect. In non-market economies, for example, the valuation
of goods to be traded is chancy at best. Importation of goods from
these countries could lead to dumping complaints and market dis-
ruption investigations.3 22 Critics of countertrade also point out,
quite correctly, that countertrade is economically inefficient. An ex-
porter of auto parts, for example, may not have any need for the
office furniture he accepts as payment under a barter agreement.
Also, the more complex countertrade transactions carry high trans-
action costs. In many cases, exporters must use a middleman to find
a buyer for the unneeded countertrade goods. Another headache of
countertrade is that the process itself can spawn foreign
competitors.3 23
318 Counterpurchase: Exporters agree to purchase a specific quantity of goods from a
country in exchange for that country's purchase of the exporter's product. The goods
being sold by each party are typically unrelated but are equivalent in value. Offset: The
exporter agrees to use goods and services from the buyer's country in the product being
sold. Offsets may be direct or indirect, depending on whether the goods and services are
integral parts of the product. In a direct offset, a U.S. manufacturer selling a product uses
a component that is made in the purchasing country. In an indirect offset, the exporter
would buy products that are peripheral to the manufacture of its product. Compensation
or Buy-back: In these deals, exporters of heavy equipment, technology or even entire facil-
ities agree to purchase a certain percentage of the output of the facility. For example,
Occidental Petroleum built anhydrous ammonia factories in the U.S.S.R. and agreed to
buy specified amounts of ammonia from these plants for 20 years. See generally WELT,
TRADE WITHOUT MONEY: BARTER AND COUNTERTRADE (1984).
319 William Lash, III, Time to Support Countertrade, J. OF Com., Nov. 13, 1991, at 8A.
320 U.S. Still Against Playing Active Role in Barter, Countertrade, Officials Say, 8 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1644 (1991).
321 Offsets in military trade among NATO members, for example, are credited with
establishing standardized military hardware in NATO and rebuilding a portion of the in-
dustrial bases of Western Europe.
322 Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., USITC Pub. 1051, Inv. No. TA-406-6 (1980).
325 This is not idle speculation. In the 1960s, Raytheon transferred Sparrow missile
technology to Italy as part of an offset program. The result was the Italian missile Aspide,
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In general, however, countertrade is a useful tool in gaining ac-
cess to global markets. It has been used widely and successfully by
American companies. For example, PepsiCo's world trading subsidi-
ary successfully offered countertrade services in the former Soviet
Union for over a decade, by trading Pepsi for Stolichnaya vodka.
Last year, PepsiCo signed a ten-year, $3 billion deal with the former
Soviets. It calls for construction of twenty-six Pepsi bottling plants
to be paid for by the sales of Russian vodka in the U.S. Additionally,
Russia will build a minimum of ten commercial ships for interna-
tional sale or lease. Foreign exchange credits from this transaction
will be used to build two Pizza Hut restaurants in Moscow. 324
Countertrade is indispensable to building market share in devel-
oping economies. To help exporters compete in global markets, the
Administration should make funds available through the Export-Im-
port Bank, an independent agency that guarantees payment for ex-
ports. Through the Department of Commerce, it should also
actively counsel exporters in need of advice. Unfortunately, the
White House intends to do otherwise. In testimony before the Sen-
ate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, Assistant
Acting Secretary of Commerce Lake stated that the Commerce De-
partment would continue its "non-interventionist" policy on
countertrade.3 25 That was a euphemistic way of saying the Adminis-
tration will not actively support exporters who may need advice on
countertrade. Mr. Lake was not entirely clear how much counter-
trade help the Commerce Department will offer exporters. How-
ever, his testimony was unpopular with members of Congress and
business representatives attending the hearing. The failure of active
U.S. government involvement in countertrade places U.S. exporters
at a competitive disadvantage to foreign companies offering
countertrade.32 6
Trade policy decisions are also often held hostage by members
of Congress in pursuit of a particular agenda. For example, under
the current budget rules of the U.S., proposed losses of revenue
must be offset by another revenue source.3 27 In the fall of 1991, this
provision threatened to delay or prevent the granting of MFN status
or GSP status to states of the former Soviet Union. House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski postponed votes on MFN
which now competes directly with the Sparrow. See Offset Agreements, Hearing before the Sub-
committee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House
of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 99-86, June 18, 1986.
324 William Lash, III, Time to Support Countertrade, J. oF CoM., Nov. 13, 1991, at 8A.
325 U.S. Still Against Playing Active Role in Barter, Countertrade, Officials Say, supra note 320.
326 Id. According to Gary L. Pacific, Manager of Countertrade for McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., "U.S. companies must either rise to the challenge by implementing
countertrade in their marketing departments or concede the international market to their
competitors." Id.
327 The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1990).
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status because the change to a lower tariff status would cost an esti-
mated $23 million in lost revenues.3 28 The delay threatened trade
normalization between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. By
jeopardizing trade with the former Eastern bloc states, democracy
and the economic and political survival of the fledgling democracies
were also threatened by the game of political football being played
by Rostenkowski and the Bush Administration.
Another example of a lack of flexibility and coordination in U.S
trade and commercial policy is the U.S. view towards keiretsu. 329 In
February 1992, United States Attorney General William Barr an-
nounced his intention to have the Department of Justice investigate
Japanese business cartels, or "keiretsu," as violative of U.S. antitrust
laws. 33 0 According to Mr. Barr, keiretsu restrict the ability of U.S.
firms to penetrate lucrative Japanese markets.33' This announce-
ment was met with criticism both inside and outside the Bush Ad-
ministration. United States Trade Representative Carla Hills, Vice
President Dan Quayle, and the Department of State all expressed
their hostility to the Barr plan. Even the White House has shied
away from it.332 Clayton Yeutter, the United States Trade Represen-
tative under President Reagan and current counselor to the Presi-
dent for domestic policy, has labeled the Barr initiative as
"something coming out of Justice" and not necessarily a policy en-
dorsed by the President.333
There are a host of problems with the Barr plan. First, it reflects
an expansion of the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust
laws. For nearly a century, it has been recognized that U.S. antitrust
laws may be extended to cover activities outside of the United States.
However, application of U.S. laws must be done gingerly, and must
balance U.S. commercial goals with the effects on other states. Fur-
thermore, the Barr plan would alter the Justice Department's Anti-
trust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, issued in
November 1988. Traditionally, foreign activities are subject to Sher-
man Antitrust Act enforcement only to the extent that the activities
328 No Vote on Soviet MFN Status Without Revenue Offsets, Rostenkowski Reiterates, 8 INT'L
TRADE REP. 1505 (1991).
329 "Keiretsu" is a Japanese "group of corporations tied together by interlocking di-
rectorates and mutual shareholding." KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE
POWER 477 (1989). Keiretsus are said to constitute the "ultimate vertically integrated
megacompany." There are Capitalists, Then There are the Japanese, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 8, 1990, at
21. See also BURNSTEIN, YENI: JAPAN'S NEW FINANCIAL EMPIRE AND ITS THREAT TO AMERICA
(1990).
330 Barr Tells TV Interviewer Sherman Act May be Used to Attack Japanese Cartels, 9 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 341 (1992).
331 Vicini, U.S. to Extend Antitrust Laws to Japanese Cartels, REUTER Bus. REP., Feb. 21,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires File.
332 Ann Devroy & Stuart Auerbach, Antitrust Proposal Draws Opposition; Get-Tough Plan on
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333 Id.
[VOL. 18
U.S. TRADE POLICY
injure U.S. consumers.3 3 4
For U.S. antitrust laws to be invoked, the United States must be
the nation primarily impacted by the activity in question. As noted
by former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, "anything that af-
fects the external trade and commerce of the United States also af-
fects the trade and commerce of other nations, and may have far
greater consequences for others than for the United States. 3 3 5 An-
other test employed in examining the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws focuses on "the nexus between the parties and
their practice and the United States, not on the mechanical circum-
stances of effect on commodity exports or imports. 3 3 6
The keiretsu system is at the heart of Japan's industrial success.
This practice of interlocking ownerships among a group of Japanese
corporations is an integral part of the Japanese corporate culture.3 3 7
Japanese keiretsu such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Dai Ichi Kangyo,
Sumitomo, Sanwa and Fuyo reportedly constitute nearly one-quarter
of Japanese business revenues. 33 8 An antitrust action against these
firms would be an action against Japanese corporate culture. Such
an extraterritorial attack would weaken an already strained relation-
ship with one of our closest trading partners.
Since July 1989, under the Structural Impediments Initiative, Ja-
pan and the United States have been examining the causes of their
trade imbalance.3 3 9 On June 28, 1990, the Japanese government
committed to a series of undertakings in six areas, including the
keiretsu system.340 These undertakings are aimed at achieving a
more open and transparent trading system. A Department of Justice
antitrust action now would jeopardize these negotiations. The Japa-
nese Foreign Ministry condemned the Barr plan of increased extra-
territorial application of the Sherman Act as unacceptable on
February 25, 1992. Masamichi Hanabusa, Spokesman for the Japa-
nese Foreign Ministry, admonished that the Barr plan would "defi-
nitely" be addressed during U.S.-Japan trade meetings. 34 '
Additionally, the Japanese parliament is considering a bill to
strengthen antitrust enforcement and penalties. This bill, drafted by
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, is scheduled for a vote shortly
334 Sherman Act Can Be Used to Fight Import Curbs, Attorney General Says, 9 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 398 (1992).
335 Nicholas Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse, 65 YAL LJ. 1087, 1150 (1956).
336 Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
337 Kelly, Port, Treece, DeGeorge & Schiller, Learning from Japan, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 27,
1992. Van Wolferen, supra note 329, at 46.
338 Van Wolferen, supra note 329, at 46.
339 See, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1992 National Trade Estimate, Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers, at 137 (1992).
340 Id.
341 Tokyo Rejects U.S. Antitrust Move as "Unacceptable", UPI, Feb. 25, 1992, available in,
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1992]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
before parliamentary elections in July, 1992.342 The Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (LDP), a close ally of corporateJapan, is feeling pressure
from the business community on this bill. With the LDP facing an
uphill battle in the election, U.S. intervention would further imperil
the legislation.
The Japanese Fair Trade Commission has also increased en-
forcement activities against antitrust violators and has completed a
study on the keiretsu system. Recently, Japanese antitrust enforcers
brought criminal charges alleging price fixing against eight plastic
food wrap manufacturers. Similar complaints against plastic irriga-
tion pipe producers followed. These charges, the first criminal ac-
tions brought by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission in seventeen
years, may signal a trend towards more aggressive antitrust enforce-
ment by the Japanese.3 43
Finally, before any antitrust actions are brought, the possible
beneficial impacts of the keiretsu system must be examined. The
keiretsu system is often credited with the industrial success of Ja-
pan.3 44 Because of the interlocking ownership, keiretsu members
are not required to sacrifice long-term corporate goals in favor of
short-term profits. This system of economic cooperation also drasti-
cally lowers transaction costs. Collaborative research efforts speed
the development of new technologies. Members know that parts
supplied from keiretsu affiliates will be delivered promptly and will
be of acceptable quality.
U.S. business leaders and economists recently have been calling
for American industry to form keiretsu-like organizations and take
advantage of cooperative efforts. David E. Cole, director of the Uni-
versity of Michigan's Office for the Study of Automotive Transporta-
tion, believes that U.S. firms are now organizing in "an American-
style keiretsu." Another supporter of the development of U.S.
keiretsu is TRW Chairman Joseph T. Gorman, who says that without
keiretsu-like cooperation, "we don't stand a chance against the
Japanese. 345
The U.S. government is already moving in this direction. On
February 27, 1992, the U.S. Senate approved the National Coopera-
.tive Research Act Extension.3 46 This bill promotes international
joint ventures and industrial cooperation and exempts certain com-
binations from U.S. anti-trust law. Sematech, the U.S.- government
342 Japan Fair Trade Commission Drafts Bill to Raise Antitrust Fines, INT'L TRADE DAILY
(BNA), Mar. 13, 1992.
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Life, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1992, at CI.
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sponsored consortium of semiconductor chip producers, is a collab-
orative effort that resembles keiretsu.347 Detroit's Big Three
automakers also have moved toward cooperation, with a $120 mil-
lion federal government grant to develop batteries for electric
cars.348 Additionally, the Big Three automakers formed the United
States Council for Automotive Research (USCAR), an umbrella
group designed to coordinate research and development.
3 49
These proposals show how uncertain the United States is about
its views on Japanese corporate integration. To abandon our policy
of negotiation, and instead adopt a stance of aggressive extraterrito-
rial application of our antitrust policies, would weaken our trading
relationship with Japan and endanger Japanese antitrust efforts.
Even worse, it might block a vital Japanese import: the spirit of in-
dustrial cooperation.3 50
V1. Conclusion
We have witnessed how the trade laws of the U.S. undermine
foreign policy, confuse our trading partners, and threaten domestic
economic development and investment. America needs a trade
agenda that is clear, coordinated, and flexible. One possible answer
lies in The Trade Reorganization Act of 1991.351 Under this pro-
posed legislation, a cabinet level U.S. Department of Trade would be
established. The bill would consolidate the functions of the United
States Trade Representative and the international activities of the
Secretary of Commerce. The Export-Import Bank of The United
States would be transferred to the new agency as well. The legisla-
tion "[d]irects the Secretary, among other things, to: (1) coordinate
U.S. policies for promoting beneficial international trade relation-
ships; (2) negotiate U.S. international trade agreements; (3) protect
American industry, agriculture, and labor from unfair or injurious
foreign competition; (4) develop trade monitoring systems; (5) de-
velop and implement U.S. policies concerning foreign investments;
and (6) administer export controls. 3 52
Another element of the proposed act establishes an Interagency
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 See Big Three U.S. Automakns Form U.S. Automotive Research Council, INT'L TRADE DAILY
(BNA), June 9, 1992. John McTague, Ford's Vice President of Technical Affairs, spoke in
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Committee on Trade Development and Finance. This Committee
would
[c]oordinate Federal policies, programs, and activities relating to in-
ternational trade development and finance, including: (1) collec-
tion, analysis, and dissemination of market information;
(2) information on and coordination of export financing; (3) repre-
sentation of United States business interests in interactions with offi-
cials of foreign governments and international organizations;
(4) assistance in identifying joint venture partners and foreign re-
search and development projects; (5) counseling on foreign stan-
dards, testing, and certification requirements; (6) trade missions and
other trade events; and (7) identification of agents and
distributors.3 53
The Committee would be composed of "representatives of the De-
partments of Treasury, Agriculture, the Office of the United States
Trade Representative, the Office of Management and Budget, the
Small Business Administration, the Export-Import Bank of the
United States, the Agency for International Development, the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation, the United States Information
Agency, and the Trade and Development Program. ' 3 5 4
A similar, yet less comprehensive, bill is the Export Trade Pro-
motion and Trade Finance Act of 199 1.55 The sponsor of this legis-
lation would establish a Bureau of Trade Development and Finance
within the Department of Commerce. The proposed Bureau would
consist of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United
States and Foreign Commercial Service and the Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Trade Development.3 5 6
These legislative initiatives should be supported. Only by con-
solidating and coordinating the agencies engaged with international
trade can a viable and successful trade policy be operational. A con-
solidated trade agency could work more closely with the Department
of State to avoid current foreign policy-international trade conflicts.
This appeal for a coordinated and flexible trade agency is not
unduly radical. One need only look at the successes of Japanese
trade policies and the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) to recognize the benefits of coordination.3 5 7 MITI
has long been lauded as a leading force in Japan's "economic mira-
cle."3 5 8 Part of MITI's success may be attributed to "Mental Flexi-
bility," the ability "to adjust, chameleon-like, to changing
conditions."3 59
The U.S. must also adhere to its stated commitment to the mul-
353 H.R. 726, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 5 (1991).
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tilateral trading system. Discriminatory and unilateral actions must
be abandoned. We should adhere to GATT principles and accept
GATT panel reports. Similarly, when we push other states to open
their markets to foreign investment and trade, we must be consistent
in our own views. The U.S. must define "national security" or offer a
more transparent Exon-Florio that offers guidance to foreign
investors.
The current debate in U.S. international trade is little more than
a "blame-game." The U.S. has blamed each of our major trading
partners for the trade deficit and the assorted ills of our economy.
Congress blames the President, who blames American business,
which in turn blames Congress. In reality, many of our current trade
problems stem from our absence of a coherent trade policy. "The
fault dear Brutus, lies not in our stars, but in ourselves.13 60
360 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, 9 (Loius B. Wright ed. 1968) (Act I, Scene 2 of the
play).
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